刚性兑付视域下地方政府债务膨胀的机理与治理  

Mechanism and Governance of Local Government Debt Expansion from the Perspective of Rigid Payment

作　　者：陈露 崔兵 CHEN Lu;CUI Bing(School of Economics and Management,Hubei Univ.of Tech.,Wuhan 430068,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北工业大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430068

出　　处：《湖北工业大学学报》2020年第6期48-53,共6页Journal of Hubei University of Technology

摘　　要：基于2012-2020年地方政府债务规模及四类债务结构进行统计分析,发现地方政府债务规模呈现膨胀趋势,债务结构非最优化配置,由此可能引发系统性风险的经验事实。运用刚性兑付理论,探究刚性兑付对地方政府债务膨胀所存在的单向传导机制、双向影响机制和无限循环博弈过程等三种机制。从刚性兑付视角提出遏制地方债务膨胀问题的治理措施,措施包括:合理划定政府与市场边界,明确政府定位;强化信息披露,完善信息披露渠道;建立刚性兑付到弹性兑付的过渡性制度安排;健全地方政府融资体系。Based on the statistical analysis of the scale of local government debt and the four types of debt structure from 2012 to 2020,this paper finds that the scale of local government debt shows an expansion trend,and that the debt structure is not optimally allocated,which may lead to empirical facts of systemic risks.On this basis,the paper tries to explore the transmission mechanism of local government debt inflation,which is one-way conduction mechanism,interaction mechanism and infinite cycle game process by the rigid payment theory.Finally,from the perspective of rigid payment,governance measures to curb the expansion of local government debt are put forward.

关 键 词：地方债务膨胀 刚性兑付 传导机制 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]