带有监督技术的最优激励合约  

Optimal Incentive Contracts with Monitoring Techniques

作　　者：郭美洁 胡支军 GUO Meijie;HU Zhijun(College of Management, Guizhou University, Guiyang,Guizhou 550025, China;College of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang,Guizhou 550025, China)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳550025 [2]贵州大学数学与统计学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《经济数学》2020年第4期84-95,共12页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71361003)。

摘　　要：针对复杂创新型项目的投资合约中出现的道德风险与逆向选择问题,建立双臂赌博机模型,研究最优的监督技术设计,使监督在项目的开发阶段发挥双重作用以降低委托代理冲突,为委托人设计合约提供参考.一方面,监督代理人的项目报告可以激励其报告项目的真实进展,从而优化了实验效率,委托人的项目收益得以提高.另一方面,由于监督使委托人更准确地了解项目的技术进展,委托人可以通过延长实验了解更多项目信息以提高生产效率.此外,监督技术在实验阶段的前期引入效果最佳.Aiming at the moral hazard and adverse selection in the investment contract of complex and innovative projects,this paper establishes a double arm gambling machine model to study the optimal design of monitoring technology,for the purpose that the monitoring can play a dual role in the development stage of the project and can reduce the principal-agent conflict.It provides reference for the principal to design the contract.On the one hand,the project report of the monitoring agent can encourage the agent to report the real progress of the project,thus optimizing the experimental efficiency and improving the principal's project expectation.On the other hand,because monitoring enables the principal to understand the technical progress of the project more accurately,the principal can learn more about the project information by extending the experiment to improve the production efficiency.In addition,the introduction of monitoring in the early stage of the experiment is the best.

关 键 词：道德风险 逆向选择 监督技术 合约设计 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学]