征地移民管理中的分歧博弈及其决策模型  

Bifurcation Game and Decision Model in Land Expropriation and Migration Management

作　　者：宋子昀[1,2] 王伟玲 SONG Ziyun;WANG Weilin(Guangdong Technical College of Water Conservancy and Electric Power Engineering,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510635,China;Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510420,China;SUN YAT-SEN University Xinhua College,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510925,China)

机构地区：[1]广东水利电力职业技术学院,广东广州510635 [2]广东外语外贸大学,广东广州510420 [3]中山大学新华学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《经济数学》2020年第4期102-106,共5页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：征地移民的协商管理中的分歧问题中主要是征地方与被征地方之间分歧.分歧主要体现在双方认知和利益诉求的差异.分析了征地移民双方的分歧特点,研究了征地移民的分歧管理模式.利用完善的博弈理论,探讨征地移民分歧管理的基本概念、方法和决策规律.借鉴线性支出系统的效用函数,研究分歧管理博弈矩阵的建立、博弈类型、博弈分析方法,为征地移民协商管理的科学体系提供科学分析方法.In the management project of land expropriation and immigration,due to the differences between the parties in terms of cognition and interest demands,there is bifurcation in the negotiation process.This paper analyzes the bifurcation characteristic between the two sides of the land expropriation and immigration,and studies the management mode of the bifurcation.This paper introduces the perfect game theory and discusses the basic concepts,methods and decision-making rules of the management of land expropriation and immigration.Using the utility function of linear expenditure system for reference,this paper studies the establishment of game matrix,game types and game analysis methods of bifurcation management,so as to provide a scientific analysis method for the land expropriation and immigration negotiation management.

关 键 词：征地移民 管理 分歧管理 博弈 建模 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]