论创业企业控制权对剩余权配置的影响与合约设计  

On the Influence of Start-up Enterprises'Control Rights on the Allocation of Residual Rights and Contract Design

作　　者：赵沙俊一 黄志启[1] Zhao shajunyi;Huang Zhiqi(North China University of Water Resource and Electrie Power,Zhengzhou Henan 450046)

机构地区：[1]华北水利水电大学,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《陕西青年职业学院学报》2020年第4期81-85,共5页Journal of Shaanxi Youth Vocational College

摘　　要：创业企业控制权不仅能影响企业的经营效率,同时也会影响剩余权分配的合约设计,所以将控制权分配问题纳入到剩余权合约设计中是十分必要的。在创业企业中假设各企业利益相关者之间完全平等,行为人共同努力经营企业,唯一的区别是企业剩余权的份额不同,且该区别也是事先合约设计中所规定的月旦现实生活中,利益相关者对企业控制权的争夺和分配也是一种非常普遍的现象,企业最优剩余索取权设计能够有效约束创业企业中的道德风险问题,通过构建模型,分析了不同融资结构及不同市场结构下的最优剩余索取权分配,并据此分析了最优合约的设计。The control right of a entrepreneurial enterprise can not only affect the operating efficiency of the enterprise,but also affect the contract design of the distribution of residual rights Therefore,it is very necessary to incorporate the problem of distribution of control rights into the design of residual rights contracts.In a entrepreneurial enterprise,it is assumed that the stakebolders of each enterprise are completely equal,and the actors work together to manage the enterprise.The only difference is that the share of the companys residual rights is different,which isalso stipulated in the contract design in advance.Stakeholder competition and allocation of corporate control rights is also a very common phenomenon.The optimal residual claim design of an enterprise can effectively restrain the moral hazard in entrepreneurial enterprises.By constructing models,it analyzes different financing structures and different market structures.Optimal residual claim rights allocation,and the design of the optimal contract is analyzed accordingly.

关 键 词：创业企业 控制权 剩余权 

分 类 号：D272.2[政治法律—政治学]