模糊需求下考虑政府奖惩的闭环供应链回收定价模型  

Models for Closed-loop Supply Chain Recovery Pricing Considering Government Rewards and Punishment Mechanism under Fuzzy Demand

作　　者：曹庆奎[1,2] 袁雯慧 任向阳 Cao Qingkui;Yuan Wenhui;Ren Xiangyang(Hebei University of Engineering,Handan 056038,China;Langfang Normal University,Langfang 065000,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工程大学,河北邯郸056038 [2]廊坊师范学院,河北廊坊065000

出　　处：《廊坊师范学院学报（自然科学版）》2020年第4期49-53,58,共6页Journal of Langfang Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：河北省高等学校人文社会科学研究项目(SD181012);河北省社会科学基金资助项目(HB17GL022)。

摘　　要：考虑市场需求的不确定性,将需求模糊化处理,建立制造商主导下政府分别对制造商、零售商、第三方回收商实行奖惩政策的闭环供应链回收定价模型,运用博弈理论得出三种回收定价模型中各决策变量基于政府奖惩力度以及最低回收率的变化。结果表明:(1)制造商主导下MM、MR模式下制造商的收益远远超过零售商;(2)MR模式下,随着政府奖惩系数的增大,系统总利润以及废旧产品回收率增加显著。Considering the uncertainty of the market demand,the demand is fuzzified,and a closed-loop supply chain recovery pricing model under the leadership of the manufacturer is established,in which the government rewards and punishes the manufacturer,the retailer and the third-party recycler respectively.Using the game theory,the decision variables in the three recovery pricing models are based on the change of the government reward and punishment strength and the minimum recovery rate.The results show that:(1)under the model of MM and MR,the manufacturer’s profit is far greater than the retailer’s.(2)In MR mode,with the increase of government reward and punishment coefficient,the total profit of the system and the recovery rate of waste products increase significantly.

关 键 词：模糊理论 闭环供应链 政府奖惩 回收定价 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]