GDP激励对地方政府新增债务的影响研究——基于政府审计的调节作用  

A Study on the Effect of GDP Incentive on Local Government′s New Debt——Based on the Regulatory Role of Government Audit

作　　者：王欣 孟强 WANG Xin;MENG Qiang(Business School,Fuyang Normal University,Fuyang 236037,Anhui Province,China)

机构地区：[1]阜阳师范大学商学院,安徽阜阳236037

出　　处：《景德镇学院学报》2020年第6期77-81,共5页Journal of JingDeZhen University

基　　金：阜阳师范大学校级一般项目(2018JYXM59);阜阳师范大学科研机构校级委托项目(2017NMG04)。

摘　　要：近年来,地方政府债务成为公众关注热点,如何控制债务增长是维护地区经济安全的重要内容。本文选取2013-2017年我国31个省(自治区、直辖市)的面板数据为样本,探究地方GDP考核对地方政府新增债务的影响。研究结果表明:在现有政策下,地方政绩GDP激励强度会促进地方政府新增债务的增加;政府审计力度增大,当地政府的新增债务会减少;在此基础上,通过加强政府审计力度可以减弱GDP激励对当地政府新增债务的正向作用。In recent years,local government debt has become a hot topic of public attention.How to control debt growth is an important part of maintaining regional economic security.This article selects the panel data as a sample including 31 provinces in China from 2013 to 2017,and explores the influence of GDP local examination on new debts of local governments.The research results show that local performance-GDP incentive will promote the increase of local government′s new debt and strengthen the power of the government audit,even reduce the new debt of local government under the existing policies.On this basis,the positive effect on the local government′s new debt from GDP incentive can be weakened by strengthening the government auditing intensity.

关 键 词：GDP激励 政府审计 地方政府新增债务 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]