“性情”别解--从金岳霖和穆尔的观点看  

An Interpretation of Xing and Qing--From Jin Yuelin and Moore’s Theory of Universals

作　　者：何松旭 HE Songxu

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学马克思主义学院,海200241

出　　处：《学术月刊》2020年第12期23-29,共7页Academic Monthly

摘　　要：“性”和“情”是传统儒家哲学的两个重要范畴。金岳霖在《论道》中分别用西方哲学中的“共相”和“殊相”概念来诠释“性”和“情”,并且通过对“性情”问题的解答形成了一套自己的理论体系。这套体系包含元学和认识论两个层面。我们可以在传统儒家的经典文本中区分出这两个层面的内容:第一个层面是心和物,第二个层面是性和情。金岳霖的诠释方式为我们解答传统儒家中的“性情”问题提供了另外一种可能性,而穆尔关于共相是存在的但又是一种否定性活动的观点,更是为“性情”问题提供了一种别具一格的诠释。Xing(“性”)and Qing(“情”)are two important categories in Confucianism.In Dao,Jin Yuelin used the concepts of universals and particulars in Western philosophy to interpret Xing and Qing respectively,and constructed his own theoretical system through answering the question of Xing and Qing.This system includes metaphysics level and epistemology level.With this interpretation,we can also find these two levels in the classic texts of Confucianism:the first level is the Xin(“心”)and Wu(“物”),and the second level is the Xing and Qing.This interpretation also gives us another approach and possibility to answer the question of Xing and Qing in Confucianism.For this reason,we begin to investigate G.E.Moore’s theory of universals.There are universals in Universal,and the question can be answered by denying any particular things.This provides an unique interpretation for the question of Xing and Qing.

关 键 词：金岳霖 性情 共相 穆尔 

分 类 号：B0[哲学宗教—哲学理论]