欧盟企业并购制度在中国国企海外并购案中的实践逻辑——“最坏情形”下“单一经济体”的认定  

Practical Logic of EU Merger Control System in China State-owned Enterprise Abroad Acquisition Cases:Identification of Single Economic Entity in the Context of Worst Case Scenario

作　　者：亚历山大·史维特里契尼 张娟娟 李苡墨(译)[2] Alexandr Svetlicinii;ZHANG Juanjuan;LI Yimo(translator)(不详)

机构地区：[1]西南科技大学拉丁美洲研究中心,四川绵阳621010 [2]澳门大学法学院,中国澳门 [3]西南科技大学法学院,四川绵阳621010

出　　处：《国际商务研究》2021年第1期63-72,共10页International Business Research

基　　金：澳门大学多年研究项目“欧盟竞争法对中国国有企业商业行为及投资规制研究”(项目编号:MYRG2018-00179-FLL)。

摘　　要：欧盟作为中国国企海外直接投资的重要阵地,其企业并购制度一直是学术界和实业界的关注焦点。虽然实践中欧委会对涉及中国国企的并购申报几乎都通过了,但是在认定“单一经济体”过程中,除了确认能源行业的所有国企被视为单一经济体之外,对于其他行业,欧委会采用回避态度,以“最坏情形”方式判断,其结论均对国企不利,给国企在欧盟投资的前景投下了阴影。另外,对于特别敏感和具有战略意义的交易,还可能会遭到欧委会基于公众利益和其他政治因素的投资审查。因此,国企应充分准备好实质性证据,证明其在商业决策中有足够的自主权,来反驳在合并评估中可能遭受的反不正当竞争的质疑,应对欧委会对中国国企参与并购交易的系统性歧视。As an important destination for China's SOEs to invest overseas,EU's merger control system has been the focus of academic and practical circles.Although in practice,the European Commission has almost approved the acquisition notification involving SOEs,in the process of identifying“single economy”,except confirming that all SOEs in the energy industry are regarded as a single economy;for other industries,the European Commission adopts an evasive attitude and the method of‘worst case scenario".Judged with this method,the conclusions are always against SOEs,which casts a shadow on the prospects for Chinese SOEs to invest in the EU.In addition,for those sensitive and strategic transactions,it may be subject to the Commission’s review based on public interest and other political factors.Therefore,the SOEs should be fully prepared with substantial evidence to prove that they have sufficient autonomy in business decision-making,and refute the query of unfair competition that may be suffered in the merger evaluation,to respond to the systematic discrimination of the European Commission against the merger transaction conducted by Chinese SOEs.

关 键 词：欧盟合并控制制度 国有企业 单一经济体 经济集中 最坏情形. 

分 类 号：DF961[政治法律—国际法学]