“第一书记”扶贫制度下基层扶贫干部的竞合逻辑——以G省T村驻村扶贫实践为例  

The Competition and Cooperation Logic of the Grassroots Poverty Alleviation Cadres under the Poverty Alleviation System of“the First Secretary”——A case study of the poverty alleviation practice in T village,G Province

作　　者：蔡胜 CAI Sheng(School of Political Science and Public Administration,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学政治学与公共管理学院,上海201620

出　　处：《天水行政学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第6期37-42,共6页Journal of Tianshui College of Administration

基　　金：华东政法大学硕士研究生学术研究及社会调研项目(项目编号2020-4-127)。

摘　　要：通过对G省T村的调研发现,在实践中,村庄内各贫困治理主体存在“竞争”与“合作”两种行为逻辑:一方面,各基层扶贫干部就村庄事务的主导权以及扶贫资源分配权存在竞争,而村域间因扶贫绩效展开脱贫竞赛;另一方面,基层扶贫干部按照制度设计相互合作落实扶贫政策和项目,同时基层扶贫干部之间、村与村之间在上级各类检查压力下会达成“共谋”以应对。这两种行为逻辑会引发扶贫工作的短期性、形式主义、扶贫工作目标和重心的偏离、村庄治理能力的弱化等问题。Based on the investigation of T village in G Province,it is found that in practice,there are two behavioral logics of“competition”and“cooperation”among poverty control subjects in the village:On the one hand,there is competition among grassroots poverty alleviation cadres for the leading right of village affairs and the right of allocation of poverty alleviation resources.On the other hand,grassroots poverty alleviation cadres cooperate with each other to implement poverty alleviation policies and projects according to the system design,and at the same time,grassroots poverty alleviation cadres and villages will reach a“collusion”to cope with the pressure from various superior inspections.These two behavioral logics will lead to problems such as the short term,formalism,the deviation of target and focus of poverty alleviation,and the weakening of village governance ability.

关 键 词：第一书记 脱贫攻坚 基层 村干部 

分 类 号：D638[政治法律—政治学]