违反FRAND承诺行为的反垄断法规制——以美国FTC诉高通“无许可—无芯片”案为视角  

Antitrust Regulation on the Breach of FRAND Commitments——the US FTC v.Qualcomm's"No License-No Chip"Case as an Example

作　　者：杨莉萍 YANG Li-ping(Law School,FuzhouUniversity,Fuzhou,Fujian,350108;Law Institute,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Peking,100720)

机构地区：[1]福州大学法学院,福建福州350108 [2]中国社会科学院法学研究所,北京100720

出　　处：《新疆大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第1期40-47,共8页Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：2019福建省中青年教师教育科研项目“创新视域下知识产权许可的反垄断法规制研究”(JAS19016);福州大学引进人才科研启动项目“比较法视域下专利限制竞争行为的反垄断法规制”(GXRC201919)。

摘　　要：FRAND承诺是一种促进竞争的事前价格控制机制,违反FRAND承诺可能对竞争、创新和消费者福利造成消极影响。美国加州北部地区法院在FTC诉高通案中,认为高通公司“无许可—无芯片”商业模式违反FRAND承诺,造成了竞争损害,违反了反垄断法上的交易义务。对于此案,一方面我国应当反思美国法院在判决中仅仅认定高通在基带芯片市场支配地位的做法,坚持我国法院和执法机关认定标准必要专利赋予其所有人市场支配地位的观点;另一方面也可以借鉴该判决中“FRAND承诺创设了一种反垄断法上交易义务”的观点,最终通过竞争损害和抗辩理由的分析,来确定违反FRAND承诺行为是否违反反垄断法。The FRAND commitment is a pre-emptive price control mechanism that promotes competition.The breach of the FRAND commitment may negatively affect competition,innovation and consumer welfare.In FTC v.Qualcomm case,the Northern District of California(United States District Court)held that Qualcomm's"no license-no chip"business model violates FRAND commitments,damaging competition and violating transaction obligations in the antitrust law.Learning from this case,China should rethink the US court's decision in determining Qualcomm's dominance in the baseband chip market,and adhere to the view that standard essential patents give their owners a market dominance in our practice of courts and enforcement agencies.On the other hand,learning from the view that the FRAND commitment created a transaction obligation in the antitrust law,we can determine whether the breach of the FRAND commitment violates the antitrust law by analyzing competition damage and defense reasons.

关 键 词：标准必要专利 FRAND承诺 无许可—无芯片 

分 类 号：D912.29[政治法律—民商法学]