美俄战术核武器困境生成原因  

Analysis on the Formation Mechanism of“the Dilemma of Tactical Nuclear Weapons”between the United States and Russia

作　　者：陈曦 Chen Xi(College of International Relations,National University of Defense Technology)

机构地区：[1]国防科技大学国际关系学院 [2]国防科技战略研究智库

出　　处：《战略决策研究》2021年第1期44-63,102,103,共22页Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making

基　　金：湖南省研究生科创项目“新兴颠覆性技术对国家安全的影响及治理策略研究”(项目编号:CX20200041)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：美国退出中导条约后,美俄陷入“边打边谈”的战术核武器困境。该困境的形成不仅基于相互之间的担忧与恐惧,也是由当前两国战术核武器发展方向逐渐突破传统认知,无法就关键概念达成一致所直接造成的。此外,困境深深扎根于两国战略稳定观的差异之中,双方在对对方战略意图和战术核武器未来发展方向的判断上存在结构性差异,这将对未来两国乃至全球战略稳定造成不利影响。After the withdrawal of the United States from the INF Treaty, the United States and Russia have been caught in the tactical nuclear weapons dilemma of "fighting while talking". This dilemma is not only based on mutual worries and fears, but is also a direct result of the two countries’ inability to reach agreement on key concepts, as the current direction of development of tactical nuclear weapons is gradually breaking through traditional perceptions.In addition, the dilemma is deeply rooted in the differences between the two countries’ views of strategic stability, and there are structural differences between the two sides in their judgments of each other’s strategic intentions and the future direction of development of tactical nuclear weapons, which will adversely affect the future strategic stability of the two countries and even the global strategic stability.

关 键 词：美国 俄罗斯 战术核武器 战略稳定观 

分 类 号：E817[军事—战略学] E712E512