地方政府社会募捐问题的两阶段信号博弈模型  

Two stage signaling game model of local government donation problem

作　　者：刘德海[1] 赵宁 Liu Dehai;Zhao Ning(School of Management Science and Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2020年第6期736-747,共12页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家重点研发计划重点专项课题资助项目(2018YFC0807500);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874024,71571033,71503035).

摘　　要：为了在灾害发生初期灾情信息不对称的情况下,帮助政府提高社会募捐效果,以灾区政府为信号发送方,社会力量为信号接收方,建立了灾区政府面向社会力量募捐的两阶段信号博弈模型.分别得出分离均衡和混同均衡的成立条件,并将不完全信息下与完全信息下的最优策略进行了比较.研究表明,在完全信息下政府的最优募捐策略会受到募捐物资总需求量的影响,重灾区政府的数量需求较大.在灾情信息不充分的情况下,重灾区政府应减少募捐物资数量并提高质量规格,作为新的信号实现信息传递,进而向公众传达真实的受灾信息,获得更好的募捐效果.This paper established a two-stage signaling game model in which the government of disaster area is the signal sender and the social force is the signal receiver to help the government improve the effect of social fund-raising under symmetric disaster information.This paper analyzed the critical conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium respectively,and compared optimal strategies under incomplete information with those under complete information.The results show that under complete information,the optimal fund-raising strategy will be affected by the total demand,and the demand quantity of the government of severely affected areas is relatively large.Under incomplete information,the government of severely affected areas should reduce the amount and improve the quality specifications to signal the true disaster information,so as to obtain better donation effect.

关 键 词：灾害救援 募捐问题 信号博弈 分离均衡 社会力量 

分 类 号：C930[经济管理—管理学]