投资冲动、债务扩张与地方政府激励目标  

Investment Impulse,Debt Expansion and Local Government Incentive Goals

作　　者：王文甫[1] 艾非 WANG WenFu;AI Fei(Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130)

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学财政税务学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《财贸研究》2021年第1期52-68,共17页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“中国宏观经济不确定性测量、效应及其传导机制研究”(18BJL027);国家社科基金重大项目“中国地方政府债务与金融稳定性研究”(20&ZD081);四川省社会科学高水平研究团队“四川金融安全研究团队”的支持。

摘　　要：通过构建包含不同地方政府目标的动态一般均衡模型,研究不同激励目标对政府债务和支出水平的影响。结果表明:地方政府短视带来了实际债务相对于目标债务的偏离,不同政府目标对债务扩张表现出不同的放大作用;合适的债务监管强度可以使地方政府的支出强度逼近居民效用最大化水平,但地方政府行为对相关参数非常敏感,这为确定债务监管强度带来了困难。通过对不同要素的拆解发现,对投资的关注是导致政府支出和借贷行为对债务监管敏感的主要原因,收入目标和税收结构的优化可能是解决地方债务问题的重要思路。This paper studies the influence of different incentive goals on government behavior by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model containing different local government goals.The study shows the following.Firstly,the short-sightedness of local government leads to deviation of debt from target debt,and different government targets show different amplification effects on debt expansion.Secondly,appropriate intensity of debt supervision can make expenditure intensity of local government approach the maximum utility level of residents,but the government behavior is very sensitive to relevant parameters,which brings difficulties to ensure the intensity of debt supervision.Thirdly,dismantling of different factors shows that the focus on investment is the main reason why government expenditure and borrowing are sensitive to the discount coefficient of government utility and debt supervision.Optimization of revenue target and tax structure may be an important way to solve local debt problem.

关 键 词：晋升激励 制度设计 政府投资 地方债 地方政府目标 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]