储备粮承储企业与粮食行政管理部门策略选择的演化博弈分析  

Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Strategy Selection of Grain Reserves Enterprises and Grain Administrative Departments

作　　者：张健 陶晓峰 李国艳 Zhang Jian;Tao Xiaofeng;Li Guoyan(Jiangsu Province Grains Group Co.LTD,Nanjing 210008,Jiangsu)

机构地区：[1]江苏省粮食集团有限责任公司,江苏南京210008

出　　处：《农业展望》2020年第10期38-43,共6页Agricultural Outlook

摘　　要：民为国基,谷为民命。粮食安全始终是关系中国国民经济发展、社会稳定和国家安全的重大战略性问题。储备粮作为粮食安全的"压舱石",管好储备粮是储备粮承储企业和粮食行政管理部门的重要使命。随着粮食收储制度改革的深入推进,以及受储备粮监管体系存在漏洞的影响,储备粮承储企业违规操作现象时有发生。为研究储备粮承储企业与粮食行政管理部门之间的行为策略选择的内在决策机制,借助演化经济研究工具,构建二者支付矩阵,分析两个群体之间交往过程中的演化博弈模型,并对策略选择进行动态稳定性分析和数值仿真模拟。研究结果表明,该系统收敛于两种状态:其一为"理想状"态,其二为"不良锁定",并针对"不良锁定"找出相应策略,跳出"不良锁定",引导双方向理想状态演化。The people are the foundation of a country,food is the primary need of the people.Food security has always been a major strategic issue concerning China’s national economic development,social stability and national security.Grain reserves are regarded as the"ballast"of grain security.It is an important mission of grain administrative departments and grain reserves enterprises to manage grain reserves well.With the deepening of grain purchase and reserves system reform,and the impact of the loopholes in the grain reserves system,illegal operations of grain reserves enterprises occur from time to time.In order to investigate the internal decision-making mechanism of behavioral strategy selection,the payment matrix of the two groups was constructed,the evolutionary game model in the interaction between the two groups was analyzed,and dynamic stability analysis and numerical simulation of strategy selection were carried out,with the help of evolutionary economic research tools.The results showed that the system converges to two states:one is the ideal state,and the other is the"bad lock".Finally,corresponding strategies were found for the"bad lock"to break out of the"bad lock"and lead the system to evolve to the ideal state.

关 键 词：储备粮承储企业 粮食行政管理部门 执法检查 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F326.11[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32