多阶段信号博弈的装备保障信息网络主动防御  

Researchon Active Defense of Equipment Support Information Network Based on Multi-stage Signaling Game

作　　者：王增光 卢昱 李玺 WANG Zeng-guang;LU Yu;LI Xi(Department of Equipment Command and Management,Shijiazhuang Campus of Army Engineering University,Shijiazhuang 050003,China;Equipment Simulation Training Center,Shijiazhuang Campus of Army Engineering University,Shijiazhuang 050003,China)

机构地区：[1]陆军工程大学石家庄校区装备指挥与管理系,石家庄050003 [2]陆军工程大学石家庄校区装备模拟训练中心,石家庄050003

出　　处：《火力与指挥控制》2020年第12期142-148,共7页Fire Control & Command Control

基　　金：国家社会科学军事学基金资助项目(15××003-184)。

摘　　要：为了解决装备保障信息网络的安全防御问题,从信号伪装的角度对装备保障信息网络的主动防御进行研究,设计了一种最优伪装信号选取方法。该方法基于多阶段信号博弈理论对装备保障信息网络攻防过程进行建模;在考虑信号伪装成本的基础上对攻防收益进行量化;给出了精炼贝叶斯均衡的求解方法,并设计了多阶段最优伪装信号选取算法。通过实验对该方法的合理性和有效性进行验证,并分析总结了装备保障信息网络安全防御的一般规律。In order to solve the security defense problem of equipment support information network,the active defense of equipment support information network is studied from the perspective of signal camouflage,and an optimal camouflage signal selection method is proposed.The attack and defense process of equipment support information network is modeled based on multi-stage signaling game theory.The network attack-defense payoffs are quantified on the basis of considering the cost of signal camouflage.The solution method of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proposed,and the multistage optimal camouflage signal selection algorithm is designed.The rationality and validity of this method are verified by the experiments,and the general rules of security defense of equipment support information network are summarized.

关 键 词：装备保障信息网络 多阶段信号博弈 精炼贝叶斯均衡 最优伪装信号 

分 类 号：TJ01[兵器科学与技术—兵器发射理论与技术] TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]