基于碳减排成本补贴政策的政企博弈问题研究  被引量:8

Research on the Game of Government and Enterprise Based on the Cost Subsidy Policy of Carbon Emission Reduction

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作  者:陈建华[1] 陈杰[1] CHEN Jianhua;CHEN Jie(School of Logistics Engineering,WUT,Wuhan 430063,China;不详)

机构地区:[1]武汉理工大学物流工程学院,湖北武汉430063

出  处:《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》2020年第6期517-523,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering

基  金:桂林航天工业学院广西航空物流研究中心基金项目(19KFJJHKWL04).

摘  要:针对政府对制造商进行碳减排成本补贴的博弈问题,考虑市场需求受消费者低碳偏好的影响,采用Stackelberg博弈方法,比较无政府补贴与政府补贴两种模式下制造商的最优碳减排水平、单位产品市场价格及社会总福利。同时,探讨补贴模式下的最优固定补贴和最优成本补贴系数并分析其影响因素。结果表明:政府补贴模式下的制造商碳减排水平、单位产品市场价格与社会总福利均优于无补贴模式下的制造商碳减排水平、单位产品市场价格与社会总福利;消费者低碳偏好程度的增加会降低固定补贴与补贴系数,环境影响系数的增加会提高固定补贴与补贴系数。最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性,该研究对政府制定碳减排补贴政策及企业进行碳减排决策具有理论指导意义。Aiming at the game problem of the government′s subsidy of carbon emission reduction costs to manufacturers,considering environmental impact and demand affected by consumers′low-carbon preference,the Stackelberg game method was used to compare the optimal carbon emission reduction of manufacturers under the two models of no subsidy and subsidy level,product market price,and social welfare.At the same time,under the subsidy model,the optimal fixed subsidy and the optimal cost subsidy coefficient were found and their influencing factors were analyzed.Research has shown that the manufacturer′s carbon emission reduction level,product market price and total social welfare under the government subsidy model are better than the no subsidy model.The increase of consumers′low-carbon preference will reduce the fixed subsidy and subsidy coefficient,and the increase of the environmental impact coefficient will increase the fixed subsidy and subsidy coefficient.Finally,the effectiveness of the model was verified through calculation examples.The research has theoretical guiding significance for the government to formulate carbon emission reduction subsidy policies and for enterprises to make carbon emission reduction decisions.

关 键 词:碳减排 最优成本补贴政策 STACKELBERG博弈 成本补贴契约 政企博弈 

分 类 号:F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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