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作 者:徐元 XU Yuan
机构地区:[1]大连海事大学法学院
出 处:《国际经贸探索》2020年第12期52-66,共15页International Economics and Trade Research
基 金:国家社科基金项目(16BFX138)。
摘 要:在国际知识产权造法活动中,不同的知识产权协定经历了不同的谈判历程,结局也大相径庭,有的取得了成功,有的却功败垂成,那么,是什么力量决定了知识产权国际谈判的命运呢?这一问题单纯从法学角度显然无法找到令人满意的答案,需要借助于国际政治和国际关系的理论与工具进行跨学科分析。文章尝试运用国际关系中的双层博弈理论,以《反假冒贸易协定》(ACTA)为实证案例,从选民的偏好和权力分布、国内政治制度、不对称信息、政治显著性等方面对ACTA的谈判和批准进行深入分析,试图探寻影响国际知识产权规则制定背后的政治经济因素,充实和丰富国际关系研究案例库,并对未来国际知识产权秩序构建和我国参与知识产权全球治理得出一些有益的启示。In the international intellectual property(IP) law-making activities, different IP agreements have gone through different negotiation processes, and the outcomes are also quite different. Some have achieved success, while others failed. Therefore, what factors determine the fate of international negotiations on intellectual property right(IPR) It is obviously impossible to find a satisfactory answer to this question just from the perspective of law. It is necessary to conduct interdisciplinary analysis with the theories and tools of international politics and international relations. This paper attempts to use the theory of two-level game in international relations and take the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement(ACTA) as an empirical case to analyze the negotiation and approval of ACTA from the aspects of the voters’ preference and power distribution, domestic political system, asymmetric information, political significance, etc., trying to explore the political and economic factors behind the formulation of international IP rules. The paper aims to enrich the case bases of international relations research, and draw some useful enlightenments for the future construction of international IP order and China’s participation in the global IPR governance.
关 键 词:《反假冒贸易协定》(ACTA) 双层博弈 赢集 知识产权
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