安全生产治理中的道德风险及其法律防范  

Moral Hazards and Its Legal Prevention in the Fieldsof Work Safety Regulation

作　　者：汤道路[1] TANG Daolu(Legal and Policy Research Center of China Work Safety Regulation,China University of Miningand Technology,Xuzhou Jiangsu 221116,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学中国安全生产法律与政策研究中心,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《安全》2020年第12期63-68,共6页Safety & Security

基　　金：国家社科基金重大招标项目(16ZDA056)。

摘　　要：由于社会主体天然的自利性,社会治理体系常有内生性道德风险。在对我国安全生产治理体系进行结构性分析和对安全生产重要法律制度进行规范性分析的基础上,发现我国安全生产相关利益主体权、责、利配置不均衡,立法考量不周,执法不严等问题会致生逆向选择、“盲井犯罪”等道德风险。通过健全安全治理体制、转向多元合作的安全生产治理模式、完善事故调查与工伤赔偿法律制度、预先评估立法与执法可能导致的负面效应等措施,从基础和源头上防范安全治理中的道德风险问题。For the natural self-interest,the social governance often occurs internal moral hazards.On the basis of structural analysis of China's work safety regulation and normative analysis of the important rules of work safety law,it can be found that the problems such as the imbalance of the rights,responsibilities and benefits of the stakeholders in work safe regulation,poor legislative consideration and lax law enforcement will result in moral hazards such as adverse selection and"blind mine crime".Moral hazards can be prevented in work safety regulation from the basis and sources by adjusting the safety governance structure,approaching to the multi-cooperation work safety governance model,perfecting the rules of accident investigation and compensation of work-related injuries,and pre-assessing the negative effects of legislation and law enforcement.

关 键 词：道德风险 盲井犯罪 多元合作安全生产治理模式 

分 类 号：X915.3[环境科学与工程—安全科学] D91[政治法律—法学]