基于信号传递博弈模型的市场化债转股问题研究  

Research on Market-oriented Debt-Equity Swap Based on Signaling Game Model

作　　者：彭晨 PENG Chen(College of Chemistry,University of Alberta,Edmonton T6G 2R3,Canada;Department of Comprehensive Planning and Coordinated Development,China Huarong Asset Management Co.,LTD.,Beijing 100033,China)

机构地区：[1]阿尔伯塔大学化学学院,加拿大埃德蒙顿T6G 2R3 [2]中国华融资产管理股份有限公司综合计划与协同发展部,北京100033

出　　处：《长春大学学报》2021年第1期26-30,共5页Journal of Changchun University

基　　金：教育部“春晖计划”项目(教外司贸20191383)。

摘　　要：市场化债转股是我国去杠杆的重要方法。尽管市场化债转股已取得一定成效,但仍存在落地率低的问题。通过构建信号传递博弈模型及案例分析,筛选出符合实施机构标准的意向企业是决定项目成功落地的关键。基于信号传递博弈模型分析,当企业信息充分披露时,实施机构可以根据其对企业转股前利润等信息作出判断。在政策层面,应完善信息披露制度,畅通参与主体之间的信号匹配渠道,推动市场化债转股项目落地。The market-oriented debt-equity swap is an important method of deleveraging in China.Although the market-oriented debt-equity swap has achieved certain results,there is still a problem of low landing rate.Through the construction of signaling game model and case analysis,the key to the successful implementation of the project is to select the intention enterprises that meet the standards of the implementing agency.Based on the analysis of signaling game model,when the enterprise information is fully disclosed,the implementing organization can make a judgment according to the information such as the profit before the conversion.In terms of policy,we should improve the information disclosure system,make the signal matching channels between participants smooth and promote the implementation of market-oriented debt-equity swap project.

关 键 词：市场化 债转股 信号传递模型 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]