农业公司与农户契约形式选择行为机制研究--基于水生蔬菜产业的多案例分析  

Research on the Behavioral Mechanism of Contract Form Selection between Agricultural Companies and Farmers:Multi-case Analysis Based on Aquatic Vegetable Industry

作　　者：吴曼 赵帮宏[1] 宗义湘[1] WU Man;ZHAO Banghong;ZONG Yixiang

机构地区：[1]河北农业大学经济管理学院,保定071000

出　　处：《农业经济问题》2020年第12期74-86,共13页Issues in Agricultural Economy

基　　金：国家特色蔬菜产业技术体系建设专项(编号:CARS-24-F-01);河北现代农业产业体系蔬菜产业经济岗(编号:HBCT2018030301)。

摘　　要：本文建立交易属性、关系特征与契约选择的研究框架,理清公司与农户契约选择行为机制,利用水生蔬菜产业的多个案例进行验证。结果表明:双边资产专用性越高,公司与农户越形成显性契约关系;在公司与农户均进行了专用性投资的情况下,不确定性升高有助于双方建立显性契约关系;在农户专用性投资近乎为零的情况下,不确定性升高农户机会主义行为更加频繁,隐形契约更多;小农户专用性投资低、行为不确定性高、守信意识差,绝大多数"公司+农户"无法达成长期、稳定的显性契约关系。本文提出重视农户和公司的意愿,促进有需求的农户横向联合,发挥村集体的声誉效应,组建行业协会等建议。This article established a research framework for transaction attributes,relationship characteristics,and contract selection,clarified the contract selection behavior mechanism between companies and farmers,and used multiple cases of the aquatic vegetable industry for verification.The results show that the higher the specificity of bilateral assets,the easier it is for companies and farmers to form an explicit contractual relationship.In the case where both the company and the farmer have made specific investments,increased uncertainty will help establish an explicit contract relationship between the above two subjects.When the household specific investment is almost zero,the uncertainty increases with more hidden contracts.Due to the low specific investment,high behavioral uncertainty and poor credibility of small farmers,the vast majority of"companies+farmers"are unable to reach a long-term and stable explicit contractual relationship.This paper puts forward suggestions such as attaching importance to the willingness of farmers and companies,promoting the horizontal association of farmers in need,making use of the reputation effect of village collectives,and establishing industry associations.

关 键 词：契约选择 资产专用性 不确定性 机会主义 

分 类 号：F326.13[经济管理—产业经济] F302.6