不同减排合同下企业间纵向持股对供应链决策的影响  

The impact of vertical shareholding among enterprises on supply chain decisions under different emission reduction contracts

作　　者：樊文平 王旭坪[1,2] 刘名武 许茂增 FAN Wenping;WANG Xuping;LIU Mingwu;XU Maozeng(Institute of Systems Engineering,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China;School of Business,Dalian University of Technology,Panjin 124221,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学系统工程研究所,辽宁大连116024 [2]大连理工大学商学院,辽宁盘锦124221 [3]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第1期189-200,共12页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471025、71531002);重庆市科委基础与前沿研究项目(cstc2018jcyjAX0137)。

摘　　要：本文针对节能服务公司融资难、回款难及其与用户之间缺乏信任等现象,结合实际中节能服务公司与制造企业采取的不同减排合同机制,分别构建了减排效益分享型合同和减排量保证型合同下企业间纵向持股的三级低碳供应链模型,并对比分析了不同减排合同下持股策略对供应链企业决策及利润的影响。通过模型分析并结合案例及数值算例发现,在减排效益分享型合同中,当制造商单独持股节能服务公司时,增加持股比例会使产品减排量和链条上其他成员利润增加,同时低碳产品市场价格增加;当零售商和制造商同时持股节能服务公司时,两公司增加持股比例同样会使企业决策和利润得到优化,实现真正意义上的供应链企业大联盟,但该种情形会加大持股比例与企业决策和利润的协调难度。此外,在减排效益分享型合同下,制造商对节能服务公司持股可使环保红利和企业效益均得到增加,建议此种减排模式下的供应链企业实施持股策略;但对于减排量保证型合同,持股策略对各企业决策及利润并无明显改善,因此该种减排合同下不建议企业间采取股权合作策略。With the full launch of China’s carbon trading market,high energy consumption and high carbon emission enterprises will be gradually incorporated into the carbon emission market system.In reality,most manufacturing companies do not have the ability to reduce emissions due to bottlenecks such as industry barriers and capital shortages.Therefore,reducing carbon emissions by professional Energy Service Companies(ESCOs)with“third party”attributes has become the best choice for these companies who do not have the ability to reduce emissions themselves.In energy conservation and emission reduction projects,emission reduction equipment and technology are funded by ESCOs(most ESCOs raise funds through financing).But they often have difficulties in financing and returning funds,resulting in shortage of funds,which will severely hinder the further expansion of the scale of development.In addition,the lack of trust between an ESCO and his user also affects the long-term cooperation between the two companies.Therefore,how to reduce the cost of abatement,increase the emission reduction,enhance the inter-enterprise robustness,and improve the overall competitiveness of supply chain enterprises in green development has become a realistic problem facing the Chinese government and enterprises.In view of the difficulties in financing,repayment and distrust with customers of ESCOs,this paper introduces the vertical shareholding strategy among enterprises.Combining the emission reduction benefit sharing contract and emission reduction guarantee contract adopted by manufacturers and ESCOs,the game theory and operation optimization methods are used to construct the models of the manufacturer holding shares in the ESCO under the two kinds of contracts mentioned above,respectively.The detailed process is as follows.Under the carbon trading policy and the low carbon preference of consumers,firstly,considering the case of adopting emission reduction benefit sharing contract among enterprises,the models of the ESCO with manufacturer�

关 键 词：节能服务公司 减排效益分享型合同 减排量保证型合同 纵向持股策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]