应急物资委托代储系统跨期激励的契约设计与管理策略研究  

Design of the intertemporal incentive contract on the agent emergency supplies reservation system and management strategies for government

作　　者：高晓宁 田军[2] 臧国全 高卫星[3] GAO Xiaoning;TIAN Jun;ZANG Guoquan;GAO Weixing(School of Information Management,Zhengzhou Date Science Research Center,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;School of Management,Xi’an Jiao tong University,Xi’an 710049,China;School of Public Management,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学信息管理学院,郑州市数据科学研究中心,河南郑州450001 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [3]郑州大学公共管理学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第1期220-230,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171157、71673255、U19042310-4)。

摘　　要：委托代储中的政府与企业存在利益博弈关系,加之双方信息共享程度较差,企业不会自觉地按照政府意愿行事,长期合作更容易产生倦怠情绪。为使企业保持长期合作的积极性,文章拟定应急物资市场价值作为衡量政府收益的主要指标,将应急物资委托代储系统单期激励契约模型拓展为多期契约模式,推导分析跨期契约模型中最优激励、最优努力程度、应急物资市场价值和政企收益随契约周期的变化关系,并与同周期下单期契约相比较。其次,设定基本参数值,运用MATLAB实验平台挖掘模拟数据,突出分析了跨期激励契约模型的优势,验证了模型推导结果。最后,在相同的实验条件下,通过模拟跨期激励契约模型下政企收益随契约周期的变化趋势,分析得出政企双方最优合作周期。结果表明,政府设计跨期激励契约优于单期激励契约,合理的合作周期能够实现应急物资委托代储过程中政企双方收益协调,为政府管理决策提供重要参考建议。Agent emergency supplies reservation is an important reservation strategy to enhance supply capacity of emergency materials,this reservation method has advantages on lowering the stocking cost,decreasing of occupied funds and reducing material waste caused by deterioration.Now local government at various levels have accepted this reservation method.However,because of existing two problems in the process of agent emergency supplies reservation,the strength of agent emergency supplies reservation system is hard to play fully:one is that the two parties have different goals during agent emergency supplies reservation,the government expects to maximize social benefits,and the fewer subsides that the government offers,the better.The enterprise often pays more attention to its economic benefits maximization,so there are cooperation game relationship between the government and the enterprise;on the other hand,there exist asymmetric information conditions in agent reservation supply chain,the government as the leading party cannot control the enterprise behavior completely,then the enterprise as the agent is more likely to suffer from emotional burnout when long period without demand or the demand is small,the effort exerted by the enterprise is lower,lead to moral hazard problem.Which is more likely to bring hidden trouble for emergency materials supply.Therefore,in the agent reserve system,the question of how to constrain the agent’s behavior becomes the key to ensuring the value of the emergency supplies and guaranteeing the supply of material.Therefore,this article designs Intertemporal Incentive Contract with long-term cooperation between government and enterprise,which can improve the agent’s motivation and can offer moral hazard prevention strategy for government.According to the above analysis,the article is organized as follows.Section one takes the emergency supplies market value as the measure of the government’s profit,designing model hypothesis and setting variables and parameters,analyzing the benefit

关 键 词：委托代储系统 应急物资市场价值 努力程度 单期激励契约 跨期激励 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济] C934[经济管理—管理学]