超额商誉、内部控制与并购绩效  

Excess Goodwill,Internal Control and M&A Performance

作　　者：张腊凤[1] 张蓉 ZHANG La-feng;ZHANG Rong(School of Economics and Management,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《经济问题》2021年第1期125-128,F0003,共5页On Economic Problems

基　　金：山西省高等学校哲学社会科学研究基地项目“高管网络对上市公司并购绩效的影响”(2016304);国家自然科学基金项目“产业技术创新联盟中的信任与协作机制研究”(7187016)。

摘　　要：在当前我国经济由高速增长向高质量增长转型的过程中,并购已成为企业有效盘活存量资源和转变发展方式的重要手段。并购过程中存在信息不对称,导致并购公司高估并购商誉,同时过高溢价的支付给企业发展带来了负担。基于此,以2007—2016年产生商誉的并购事件为研究对象,采用多元回归的方法,研究超额商誉与并购绩效的关系。研究发现超额商誉对并购绩效具有负向影响,而且这种不利影响持续到并购后两年。实证结果还表明,有效的内部控制能缓解超额商誉对并购绩效的负向影响,即与内控质量高的企业相比,内控质量差的企业超额商誉对并购绩效的负向影响更显著。M&A has become an important way for enterprises to effectively use existing resources and change their development mode in the economic transformation from high-speed growth to high-quality growth.Due to the information asymmetry in the process of M&A,overestimated goodwill arises and excessive premium has become a burden on enterprise development.Thus,aimed at the M&A deals from the year 2007 to 2016,this paper approaches the relationship between excess goodwill and M&A performance by employing multiple regression and grouping methods.It is found that excess goodwill has a negative effect on the performance of M&A,which lasts for two years.The empirical results also show that effective internal control can alleviate the negative impact of excess goodwill on M&A performance,which means that the negative impact of excess goodwill on M&A performance is more significant in firms with low-quality internal control than firms with high-quality internal control.

关 键 词：超额商誉 内部控制 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F727.1[经济管理—产业经济]