商誉、准则与制度:万亿商誉资产之谜  

Goodwill,Accounting Standards and Institutions:A Theoretical Framework on Trillions of Goodwill Assets

作　　者：李晶晶 关月琴 魏明海[3] 谢素娟 LI Jing-jing;GUAN Yue-qin;WEI Ming-hai;XIE Su-juan(School of Economics and Management,Harbin Institute of Technology,Shenzhen,518000,China;Business School,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou, Guangdong,510275,China;Center for Accounting,Finance and Institutions,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510275,China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学(深圳)经济管理学院,深圳518000 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275 [3]中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心,广东广州510275

出　　处：《经济管理》2020年第12期151-167,共17页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“并购业绩补偿承诺的作用机理与经济效应研究”(71702196);国家自然科学基金项目“盈余公告前漂移的形成机理研究”(71772181);国家自然科学基金项目“经理人非财务业绩评价与企业创新研究:基于高管权力距离视角的分析”(71702197)。

摘　　要：本文从商誉的经济实质出发,结合我国商誉会计准则和并购业绩补偿承诺制度,分析商誉在形成、确认和后续计量中的关键冲突问题并给予理论和制度解释。本文先从会计准则层面分析了商誉确认会计准则的内在假定与现实条件的冲突,认为现实条件下基于现行准则确认的商誉天然包含了部分“杂质”和“噪音”。聚焦并购业绩承诺制度,本文深入剖析了并购业绩承诺制度设计缺陷和衍生的代理冲突异化,并实证检验业绩承诺制度对并购溢价、商誉确认以及未来商誉减值的影响。检验发现,并购业绩承诺使得并购溢价和商誉确认金额更高,加大了未来商誉减值概率。进一步,本文发现并购业绩承诺制度降低了商誉的价值相关性。本文认为,“倒挤式”商誉确认准则下,并购业绩补偿承诺制度的“低成本承诺”缺陷和衍生的代理问题变异,最终引致“商誉(减值)乱象”。为加强会计准则与市场监管制度之间应有的动态匹配性,本文还就并购业绩承诺制度的完善、商誉资产初始确认与后续处理的会计准则提出了相关改革建议。In recent years,the rapid increase in mergers and acquisitions(M&As)in China's capital market has created a large amount of goodwill assets that has exerted great impacts on Chinese listed firms.Drawing from current goodwill accounting standards,this study discovers the conflicts between the inherent assumptions and realistic conditions of the accounting standards for goodwill recognition,which suggests that the current accounting standards for goodwill contains some defects.In order to reduce overvaluation risk,adverse selection problems and to protect minority investors,the China's Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)issued the‘The Administration Measures for Significant Asset Restructuring of Listed Companies'in 2008.According to the Measures,the acquirers can require acquirees to make performance commitments on the future profitability of target assets,and sign a compensation agreement for the difference between the expected profit and the actual profit.For the transactions which are valuated based on discounted future expected cash flows,CSRC explicitly stipulated that the acquirees should sign performance commitment contracts with acquirers to make sure that the acquirers could evaluate targets credibly based on their expected future performances.The original intention of the performance commitment regulation is expected to alleviate information asymmetry,thereby reducing moral hazard and adverse selection problems in M&As.From the perspective of game theory and contract theory,performance compensation agreement can be divided into two parts:performance commitments and compensation agreements.Ideally,the compensation agreement makes the performance commitment credible,and the performance compensation commitment through the establishment of a clear contract mechanism is conducive to renegotiation after the transaction,reducing contract frictions caused by incomplete information or uncertainty.From the perspective of the signaling theory,performance commitments by disclosing and promising future expected

关 键 词：商誉 并购业绩承诺制度 商誉会计准则 代理冲突异化 价值相关性 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]