基于最公平最小核心法的大受端电网过江断面阻塞费用分摊研究  

Research on congestion cost allocation for cross-river section of large receiving-end grid based on fairest least core method

作　　者：苗曦云 王蓓蓓[1] 郭莉 吴晨 MIAO Xiyun;WANG Beibei;GUO Li;WU Chen(School of Electrical Engineering,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,China;Economic Research Institute of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Nanjing 210008,China)

机构地区：[1]东南大学电气工程学院,江苏南京210096 [2]国网江苏省电力有限公司经济技术研究院,江苏南京210008

出　　处：《电力自动化设备》2021年第2期172-178,共7页Electric Power Automation Equipment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471036);国网江苏省电力有限公司科技项目(J2019058)。

摘　　要：针对现货市场建设初期阶段我国东部某省受端电网过江断面偶发性的阻塞问题,基于英国电力市场阻塞管理的再调度思路,构建基于合作博弈的阻塞费用分摊模型,提出最公平最小核心分配方式,并将其用于过江断面阻塞管理。算例分析验证了所提分摊方法的合理性和有效性,其兼具公平性和稳定性,有助于参与者形成稳定的联盟,避免由于分摊机制不合理造成参与者退出联盟的非理性行为。Aiming at the occasional congestion problem of cross-river section in receiving-end grid of a province in eastern China in the early stage of spot market construction,a cooperative game based congestion cost allocation model is built based on the rescheduling idea for congestion management of electricity market in England,and the fairest least core allocation mode is proposed and applied in the congestion management of cross-river section.Case analysis verifies the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed allocation method,it has both fairness and stability,which helps the participants form a stable coalition and avoid the irrational behavior of withdrawing from the coalition due to unreasonable allocation mechanism.

关 键 词：过江断面输电阻塞 再调度 合作博弈 最公平最小核心分配 稳定性 公平性 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]