论政府应急管理中的自利性与控制  

On Self-Interest and Control in Government Emergency Management

作　　者：李咏梅[1] 郑千千[1] LI Yongmei;ZHENG Qianqian(The Internet of Things Industry Development Research Base,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学物联网产业发展研究基地,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第6期1-8,共8页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：教育部青年基金项目“当代资本主义经济的金融化和虚拟化研究”(17YJC710114)。

摘　　要：不同于社会常态时期的政府自利性,政府应急管理中的自利性表现为:应急管理中双向呈现的政府自利性、应急管理中应急性权力扩张的政府自利性和政府应急管理中不可忽视的隐形自利性。政府应急管理中自利性的存在对内会产生不必要的死伤、过多的经济损失、社会负面影响、社会恐慌和信任危机等一系列民生影响,从而无益于政府形象的塑造,也可能会产生负面的国际影响。为此,要控制政府应急管理中的自利性,须从推进绿色发展理念与制度设计的融合、强化政府官员的公共危机意识、建立良性应急管理机制和完善我国应急管理的法律体系等方面着手。Unlike the government’s self-interest in normal times,self-interest in government emergency management is multifaceted,as is shown by the two-way government self-interest,government self-interest in response to the acute expansion of power and invisible self-interest that cannot be ignored.The existence of self-interest in government emergency management will cause a series of livelihood impacts,such as unnecessary death and injury,excessive economic loss,negative social impact,social panic and trust crisis,which will affect government image and lead to negative international influence.To control self-interest in government emergency management,it is necessary to promote the fusion of green development concept and institutional design,strengthen the public crisis awareness of government officials,establish a sound emergency management mechanism and improve the legal system of emergency management in China.

关 键 词：公共危机 应急管理 政府自利性 权力控制 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学] C931[经济管理—管理学]