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作 者:卫雪晴 WEI Xue-qing(School of Public Administration,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)
出 处:《四川环境》2021年第1期223-227,共5页Sichuan Environment
摘 要:河长制是中国水环境治理的重大创新实践,其明确的责任、针对性的治理模式有效实现了水环境质量的大步提升。然而,以行政区划为基础的河长制与流域整体性治理之间依然存在着操作上的缝隙亟待解决。以流域水污染为典型对象,从共容利益的角度,讨论了上、下游河长协同治理的利益博弈结构,明确影响上、下游合作的因素,进而提出河长制背景下促进流域协同治理要从强化协同治理收益、降低交易风险、构建多方联动的协同治理网络三方面展开。River chief system is a major innovative practice of water environment governance in China,and its clear responsibility and targeted governance model has effectively improved the water environment quality.However,there are still some operational gaps between the river chief system based on administrative division and the overall governance of the river basin.Taking river basin water pollution as a typical object,from the perspective of mutual interests,discussed the benefit game structure of cooperative governance of upper and lower river chiefs,clarified the factors of upstream and downstream cooperation,and then proposed that the promotion of basin collaborative governance under the background of river chief system should be carriedout from three aspects: strengthening the benefits of cooperative governance,reducing transaction risks,and constructing multilateral linkage collaborative governance network.
分 类 号:TV213.4[水利工程—水文学及水资源]
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