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作 者:张娟 王子玥 余菲菲[1] ZHANG Juan;WANG Ziyue;YU Feifei(Hohai University,Nanjing,China)
机构地区:[1]河海大学商学院,南京市211100
出 处:《管理学报》2020年第11期1697-1705,共9页Chinese Journal of Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501059)。
摘 要:针对掌握自主创新能力的供应商与制造商组成的供应链,在两种技术创新模式下探讨双方的研发投入博弈、供应商技术创新模式选择,以及供应商自主创新能力在博弈中的作用。研究表明:①当传统产品供应链效率非常低时,供应商选择独立研发新产品,其新产品研发通过“广告信号”作用刺激制造商增加技术研发投入,从而提高传统产品及零部件销售;②当新产品的市场接受度非常高时,供应商总选择与制造商合作研发,并能在一定的利润分配比例下达到双赢;③供应商的自主研发能力总能帮助其在与制造商的博弈中获得更多利益。For a supply chain consisting of a supplier with independent innovation ability and a manufacturer,this study discusses the R&D investment game between manufacturers and suppliers under two technology innovation models,gives the choice of the technological innovation mode when the supplier produces new products,and analyzes the role of independent innovation capabilities of suppliers in the game.Research shows that:①When traditional product supply chains are very inefficient,supplierschoose to develop new products independently.At this time,the supplier’s R&D of new products stimulates manufacturers to increase investment in R&D through the role of“advertising signals”,thereby increasing sales of traditional products and parts.②When the market acceptance of new products is very high,suppliers always choose to cooperate with manufacturers to develop new products,and can achieve a win-win situation under a certain profit distribution.③Suppliers’independent R&D capabilities can always help them gain more benefits in the game with manufacturers.
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