企业创新能力、消费者参与和新产品开发  

Firm’s Innovation Capacity,Consumer Participation and New Product Development:An Analysis Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：张国印 倪得兵[1] 唐小我[1] ZHANG Guoyin;NI Debing;TANG Xiaowo(University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu,China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都市611731

出　　处：《管理学报》2021年第2期253-261,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972026,71840007)。

摘　　要：通过构建企业和消费者之间的不完全信息动态博弈模型,以探究“产品共同创新中,企业如何通过新产品样品创新程度激励消费者努力行为,并基于该努力行为传递的消费者偏好信息,选择是否生产并销售新产品”这一问题。研究表明:只要新产品生产成本充分高,那么对于任意创新程度的新产品样品,消费者在参与过程中都能真实揭示其偏好;存在一个临界创新能力水平,使得具有较高创新能力的企业总能提供其创新能力约束下最高创新程度的样品,但不同的企业创新能力将引致不同的产品定价方式;该临界创新能力水平随着消费者产品改进能力的增加而降低。Noting the practical observation that firms often need to introduce consumer participation in new product development,this studybuilds a signaling game model to research:①How can firms encourage consumers’effort behavior through the innovativeness of new product samples?②How can firms accurately judge the consumers’preference type based on their effort behavior so as to firms can choose whether to produce and sell new products?Based on some technical assumptions,the following main results were obtained.As long as the production cost of the new product is sufficiently high,consumers will truly reveal their preferences in the participation process through their effort behavior;There is a critical level of firms’innovation capacity,which makes the firms with higher innovation capacity provide the highest innovativeness of new product samples under the constraint of innovation ability.Under the condition that the enterprises provide the highest innovativeness,different innovation capacity will lead to different pricing of innovative products;The critical level of innovation capacity decreases with the increase of consumer product improvement capacity.

关 键 词：企业创新能力 消费者参与 产品创新 信号传递博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]