信息不对称下信贷市场的惜贷与挤出效应  

Loan-Reduction and Crowding-Out Effects in Asymmetric-Information Credit Markets

作　　者：周耿[1,2] 阮东喆 范从来[2] ZHOU Geng;RUAN Dong-zhe;FAN Cong-lai(不详)

机构地区：[1]南京大学长江三角洲经济社会研究发展中心 [2]南京大学商学院,南京210093

出　　处：《金融论坛》2021年第1期25-36,共12页Finance Forum

基　　金：教育部“创新团队发展计划”滚动支持项目(IRT_17R52);江苏省社会科学基金项目(20EYB013)。

摘　　要：通过收集和处理借贷平台日常运行中形成的真实数据,本文发现信息不对称条件下信贷市场逆向选择会导致市场萎缩的两类效应;其一为"惜贷"效应:随着信息不对称程度的加深,借贷双方最终达成的合约额度降低和交易匹配时间延长,市场的有效供给萎缩;其二为"挤出"效应:随着信息不对称程度的恶化,借贷双方合约的利率将会升高、期限缩短,市场的有效需求萎缩。通过完善人工智能、大数据和区块链等金融科技并加强银企关系,可以降低信息不对称,进而缓解逆向选择带来的上述不利影响。By collecting and processing real data formed in the daily operation of lending platforms, the authors of this paper discovered two types of effects of market shrinkage result from the adverse selection of asymmetric-information credit markets;the first is the"credit-reduction"effect that, as the degree of information asymmetry increases, the final contract amount agreed by the borrower and lender decreases and the transaction matching time extends, and the effective supply of the market shrinks;the second is the"crowding out"effect that, as the degree of information asymmetry increases, the interest rate of the contract between the borrower and the lender rises, the term shortens, and the effective market demand shrinks.Improving the fintech such as artificial intelligence, big data and block chain, and strengthening the relationship between banks and enterprises can reduce the information asymmetry and the above-mentioned effects caused by adverse selection.

关 键 词：信贷市场 信息不对称 逆向选择 惜贷效应 挤出效应 

分 类 号：E44[军事—军事理论]