水源涵养林生态产权与水文生态服务价值实现:基于讨价还价博弈  

Ecological property right of water conservation forest and value realization of hydrological and ecological services:based on the bargaining game

作　　者：李敏[1] 孟全省[1] LI Min;MENG Quanxing(College of Economics and Management,Northwest A&F University,Shaanxi Yangling 712100,China)

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学(杨凌)经济管理学院,陕西杨凌712100

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2021年第1期173-181,共9页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：陕西省创新能力支撑计划项目“陕西省重点生态功能区跨区域补偿体系研究”(批准号:2018KRM011)。

摘　　要：随着经济社会的发展,水源地保护和流域上下游利益均衡问题日益突出。集中体现是经济社会发展面临水资源短缺问题,而水源地缺乏环境行为意愿对水源涵养林进行保护。环境行为意愿问题折射了现行水源涵养林产权制度的缺陷:生态产权缺失使得水文生态服务外部性无法内部化,导致了生态治理中的市场失灵。由此,文章围绕水源涵养林生态产权展开,通过分析水文生态服务的地理运动判别其外部性的作用区域,进而明确水文生态服务的供给者和需求者。基于产权细分理论,将水源涵养林的产权分为生态产权和经济产权。生态产权的有效分离形成了水文生态服务市场,水文生态服务价值通过产权流转实现。在分析中指出,水源涵养林的所有者是文水生态服务的供给者,水库是水文生态服务的需求者;在市场交易模式下,二者关于价格的分歧,可以通过不断协商,达成合作与共识。着眼于此,本文基于讨价还价博弈理论,建立不完全信息动态博弈模型研究水文生态服务供给者和需求者的讨价还价活动,使用MATLAB软件,以国家森林资源连续清查统计为主要数据,以陕西省为例对水库汇流区农户和水库的博弈过程进行仿真模拟,结果表明:引入政府奖励作为激励机制能够将谈判双方的保留价格揭示出来。基于此,本文提出通过建立生态产权制度完善水源涵养林的生态补偿机制,即明晰生态产权,消除交易对象模糊不清引起的争议;赋予产权人自由交易的权益,通过流转交换实现产权权益;引入激励机制,形成价格信息揭示直接机制。本文进一步提出政府应通过对市场主体的规制和完善相关法律体系、资金保障体系、监管评估体系,来保障水文生态服务市场的有效运行。With the growth of the economy,some issues,such as water source protection and balance of interests between up and down stream water sources,have become increasingly prominent.This is mainly reflected in the issue of water shortage,which is caused by the lack of protection willingness of environmental behavior in the water source areas.The lack of willingness of environmental behavior reflects the defects of the current property right system of water conservation forest.Specifically,the absence of ecological property right makes the externality of the hydrological and ecological services unable to be internalized,leading to a market failure in ecological management.Thus,focusing on the ecological property right of the water conservation forest,this paper analyzes the geographical movement of the hydrological and ecological services to identify the region that gets benefit from the externality,and to identify the supply and demand of the hydrological and ecological services.According to the theory of property right division,the property right of water conservation forest can be divided into ecological and economic property rights.The effective division of ecological property right forms the market of hydrological and ecological services,and the value of hydrological and ecological services is realized through property right transactions.In the analysis,the providers and demanders of hydrological and ecological services are the owners of water conservation forests and reservoirs respectively.In the transaction market,they could continuously negotiate the price and reach cooperation and consensus.Furthermore,deeply rooted in the bargaining game theory,this paper establishes a dynamic game model with incomplete information to analyze the bargaining activities of hydrological and ecological service providers and demanders.Taking the national forest resources continuous inventory statistics as the main data and Shaanxi Province as an example,this paper uses the MATLAB software to simulate the game process.The results s

关 键 词：水源涵养林 水文生态服务 生态产权 讨价还价博弈 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]