基于Stackelberg博弈的收费公路PPP项目价格补偿研究  

Research on Price Compensation of Turnpike PPP Project Based on Stackelberg Game

作　　者：王飞[1] 周威 WANG Fei;ZHOU Wei(Hebei University of Engineering,Handan 056038,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工程大学,邯郸056038

出　　处：《价值工程》2021年第2期85-86,共2页Value Engineering

摘　　要：针对PPP项目中收益不足的风险,研究了政府部门向私营部门提供价格补偿能否实现私营利润和社会福利的帕累托改进。通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,描述了私营部门和政府部门分别对收费价格和价格补偿决策的过程,分析了政府部门提供的价格补偿对私营利润和社会福利的影响。研究表明:政府部门的价格补偿可以通过降低私营部门收费价格提高私营利润和社会福利。Aiming at the risk of insufficient income in PPP projects,this paper studies whether the government can realize the Pareto improvement of private profit and social welfare by providing price compensation to the private sector.By building a Stackelberg game model,the paper describes the decision-making process of the private sector and the government on the charge price and the price compensation respectively,and analyzes the impact of the price compensation provided by the government on private profit and social welfare.The research shows that price compensation by the government sector can increase private profits and social welfare by reducing the fees charged by private enterprises.

关 键 词：收益不足风险 价格补偿 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]