实报还是谎报——双边信息激励与供应链效率  

Telling truth or lying:Bilateral information incentive and supply chain efficiency

作　　者：王新辉 苏应生[2] 郭红梅 汪贤裕 WANG Xinhui;SU Yingsheng;GUO Hongmei;WANG Xianyu(School of Computer Science and Technology,Southwest Minzu University,Chengdu 610041,China;School of Statistics,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 610074,China;Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu,610064,Chengdu,China)

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学计算机科学与技术学院,四川成都610041 [2]西南财经大学统计学院,四川成都610074 [3]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2021年第2期167-176,共10页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71501161);教育部人文社科青年项目(16YJC630026);中央高校基本科研业务资助项目(2018NZYQN29)。

摘　　要：探讨了双边不对称信息下供应链信息真实分享和谎报对效率的影响。首先,给出完全信息下的最优商品交易量和供应链利润作为比较基准。其次,构建双方信息真实分享的激励模型。研究发现激励双方信息真实共享所需的信息租金降低交易量和供应链利润。再次,构建允许信息谎报的交易量谈判模型。研究发现,供销双方都偏好高报自己的信息类型。个体谎报信息的幅度随着谈判力增加而减小。拥有绝对谈判力的一方不会谎报信息。供应链效率与谎报信息的幅度、成本上界以及销售价格相关。最后,通过数值算例对实报信息和谎报信息下交易量、供应链个体利润及效率进行对比分析。研究结果为管理实践提供一定的洞见:供应链企业是否激励双边信息分享可根据双方成本大小进行选择。Information affects largely supply chain firms′decisions and supply chain efficiency.In a supply chain,truthfully reporting their(private)information between the upstream firm and the downstream firm enables better decisions but meanwhile,incurs information rent for revealing as well.Conversely,misreporting information reduces information rent but leads to double marginalization effect(of reporting information).Thus,the research questions are addressed as follows:How does information truthfully sharing or information misreporting affect both the efficiency and decision-making of a supply chain firm?Does sharing true information always generate a higher supply chain efficiency than misreporting information?How is it determined whether to encourage information sharing or to permit information misreporting?To answer the above-mentioned questions,a two-stage supply chain consisting of one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-neutral retailer is considered,who have private production cost and retail cost,respectively.Firstly,a newsvendor model under full information is constructed with the optimal trading quantity and the supply chain profit as benchmarks.Secondly,an information incentive model exchanging information truthfully is constructed.Under this case,only when the supplier′s information rent and the retailer′s information rent are satisfied can information truthfully sharing be achieved.It also reveals that information rents of both sides affect the trading quantity and supply chain profits.Compared with the full information case,the trading quantity and the supply chain profit are reduced.Thirdly,a bargaining model of the trading quantity that allows information misreporting is constructed.Under this case,after negotiating a trading quantity by reporting their private information,the supplier and the retailer divide profits according to their own bargaining power.It shows that the supplier and the retailer prefer to announce a higher information type during their negotiation.The individual′s information

关 键 词：供应链效率 双边不对称信息 信息租金 纳什谈判 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]