高管内部债权激励研究述评与未来展望  

Executive Debt-Based Incentives:A Literature Review and Future Research Directions

作　　者：徐宁[1] 袁琛 XU Ning;YUAN Chen(Shandong University,Jinan,Shandong,China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,济南市250100

出　　处：《管理学报》2021年第3期464-474,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872103,71872101);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2018MG007)。

摘　　要：运用文献回顾法,对高管内部债权激励的独特属性、测量方式、作用路径及治理效应等方面的文献进行梳理与分析。研究发现:相对于薪酬及股权激励,债权激励具有对未来支付的不确定性、对公司清算价值的高敏感性、对高管冒险倾向的抑制性等独特属性;基于最优契约理论与管理层权力理论,债权激励具有两条迥异的作用路径,一是实现激励相容降低代理成本,二是凸显权力寻租增加愤怒成本;在当前实践中,债权激励对公司风险承担水平、公司治理水平、战略决策、公司价值及利益相关者行为等均会产生积极的治理效应。在此基础上,阐述了债权激励治理效应实现的理论框架及主要不足。Based on the systematic literature review method,this paper sorts out and analyzes the literature on the attributes,measurements,paths,and governance effects of executive debt-based incentives.Compared with salary and equity incentives,the research finds that executive debt-based incentive has unique attributes,such as uncertainty of future payment,high sensitivity to corporate liquidation value,and inhibition to the risk-taking tendency of executives.Based on the optimal contract theory and the managerial power theory,executive debt-based incentive has two different paths,one is to reduce the agency cost by realizing incentive alignment,the other is to highlight the rent-seeking effect and increase the outrage cost.In the current practice,executive debt-based incentives have positive governance effects on the corporate risk-bearing level,corporate governance level,strategic decision-making,corporate value,and stakeholder behavior.Based on above analysis,the research framework of achieving the governance effect of debt-based incentives and the main deficiencies are elaborated.

关 键 词：高管内部债权 退休金计划 递延薪酬 代理成本 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]