Side-channel attack-resistant AES S-box with hidden subfield inversion and glitch-free masking  

作　　者：Xiangyu Li Pengyuan Jiao Chaoqun Yang 

机构地区：[1]Institute of Microelectronics,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China [2]Beijing National Research Center for Information Science and Technology,Beijing 100084,China [3]School of Applied Science,Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100192,China

出　　处：《Journal of Semiconductors》2021年第3期60-65,共6页半导体学报（英文版）

基　　金：This work was supported by the National Science and Technology Major Project of China(2017ZX01030301).

摘　　要：A side-channel attack(SCA)-resistant AES S-box implementation is proposed,which is an improvement from the power-aware hiding(PAH)S-box but with higher security and a smaller area.We use the composite field approach and apply the PAH method to the inversion in the nonlinear kernel and a masking method to the other parts.In addition,a delaymatched enable control technique is used to suppress glitches in the masked parts.The evaluation results show that its area is contracted to 63.3%of the full PAH S-box,and its power-delay product is much lower than that of the masking implementation.The leakage assessment using simulation power traces concludes that it has no detectable leakage under t-test and that it at least can thwart the moment-correlation analysis using 665000 noiseless traces.

关 键 词：ASIC side-channel attack AES S-box power-aware hiding glitch-free 

分 类 号：TN918.4[电子电信—通信与信息系统]