模态理性论的双重两难  

The Double Dilemma for Modal Rationalism

作　　者：冯书怡 FENG Shuyi(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei,430072)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2021年第3期23-30,共8页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金“可设想性理论的应用研究”(项目编号:19YJC720009);国家社会科学基金一般项目“当代模态知识论领域的理性论和经验论研究”(项目编号:20BZX093)。

摘　　要：模态理性论是模态认识论领域占主导地位的主流理论。它在哲学各分支领域,如心灵哲学和形而上学的应用也非常广泛。本文有两个目的:(1)通过梳理模态理性论的理论建构,本文将揭示该理论面临双重两难。(2)本文将指出,学者们在应用模态理性论时往往忽视了这两个两难。对两难的忽视导致模态理性论在哲学各分支领域的应用存在走弯路和误用的现象。In the past decades, modal rationalism has been the dominant position in the field of modal epistemology. Moreover, it is widely applied in other fields, such as metaphysics and philosophy of mind. This paper has two aims: First, by analyzing how modal rationalism is established, it points out that modal rationalism faces a double dilemma. Second, it points out that many philosophers fail to see the dilemmas and therefore make a detour or misuse modal rationalism.

关 键 词：模态理性论 可设想性 CP论题 两难 

分 类 号：B815[哲学宗教—逻辑学]