基于委托—代理理论的城市节能管理目标分解研究  

A Study on Decomposition of Urban Energy-saving Management Goals Based on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：黄建 冯升波[2] 冯蕾 牛彦涛 Huang Jian;Feng Shengbo;Feng Lei;Niu Yantao

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学法政学院 [2]中国宏观经济研究院能源研究所 [3]中新城镇化(北京)科技有限责任公司

出　　处：《宏观经济研究》2021年第1期150-161,175,共13页Macroeconomics

基　　金：2019年江苏省社科基金后期资助项目“城市节能减排精细化管理路径与机制研究”(基金号:19HQ033)的资助。

摘　　要：控制能耗强度和能源总量是中国节能管理的主要方式。"十二五"以来,节能目标的确定与分解相比"十一五"期间更为科学,但仍存在"条""块"目标不协同,"条""块"目标分解不彻底;管理的抓手少、覆盖范围小;管理碎片化、条块分割、部门交叉等问题。本文构建了城市节能目标分解的委托—代理模型,深入分析节能管理目标的分解机理,基于市级节能主管部门作为"委托人"的增量成本最小化,以及区县级节能主管部门作为"代理人"追求"最有利"的节能分解目标,考虑了自顶向下式分解、讨价还价策略以及信息披露策略三种委托—代理结构。结论认为,自顶向下式的分解只有在边际节能收益较低、节能潜力较大的工业化初期具有较大优势;讨价还价策略将产生更多交易成本,随着边际节能成本越来越高,讨价还价策略所带来的交易成本也越来越高,且讨价还价策略不具有跨期可复制性。信息披露策略具有初期投入高,但边际使用成本不断下降的特点。另外,随着中国基层治理能力的完善,基层政府在节能信息披露方面的优势将越来越显著,因此必须重组信息披露方式,不断下探基层组织,建立"网格化"的节能信息搜集与披露系统。Controlling the intensity of energy consumption and total energy is the main method of energy conservation management in China.Since the‘Twelfth Five-Year Plan’period,the determination and decomposition of energy-saving goals has been more scientific than during the‘Eleventh Five-Year Plan’period,but there is still a lack of synergy between the‘bar’and‘block’goals,and the‘bar’and‘block’targets are not completely resolved.There are few management tools and small coverage;management fragmentation,segmentation,departmental crossover and other issues.This paper constructs a principal-agent model for the decomposition of urban energy-saving goals,deeply analyzes the decomposition mechanism of energy-saving management goals,based on the minimization of incremental costs of municipal energy-saving authorities as the‘principal’,and district and county-level energy-saving authorities as‘agent’pursues the‘most favorable’energy-saving decomposition goal,considering three principal-agent structures of top-down decomposition,bargaining strategy,and information disclosure strategy.It is concluded that the top-down decomposition only has a greater advantage in the initial stage of industrialization when the marginal energy-saving benefit is low and the energy-saving potential is large;the bargaining strategy will generate more transaction costs,and as the marginal energy-saving cost becomes higher and higher,the transaction costs associated with bargaining strategies are also becoming increasingly high,and the bargaining strategy is not reproducible across periods.The information disclosure strategy has the characteristics of high initial investment,but the marginal use cost continues to decline.In addition,with the improvement of China’s grassroots governance capabilities,the advantages of grassroots governments in energy-saving information disclosure will become more and more significant.Therefore,it is necessary to reorganize the information disclosure methods,continue to explore the gra

关 键 词：城市节能 目标分解 委托—代理理论 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]