平台独家交易妨碍公平竞争吗?——以互联网外卖平台“二选一”为例  

Do Platform Exclusive Dealings Impede Fair Competition?—Taking Internet Catering Takeaway Platforms for Example

作　　者：乔岳[1] 杨锡 Qiao Yue;Yang Xi(School of Innovation and Entrepreneurship,Shandong University,Qingdao 266237,P.R.China;School of Economics,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学国际创新转化学院,青岛266237 [2]山东大学经济学院,济南250100

出　　处：《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第2期98-109,共12页Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目“法律经济学的实证方法研究”(15YJCZH130)。

摘　　要：以“二选一”为表现的独家交易作为平台厂商常用的竞争策略正越来越多地受到反垄断执法机构的关注。但受制于双边市场交叉网络外部性和较高的竞争动态性等因素,如何识别独家交易的竞争效果成为监管的重点和难点之一。从我国互联网外卖平台的实际情况出发,运用博弈论方法构建理论模型,定量比较和分析了平台实施独家交易对双边用户及社会总福利的影响,发现社会总福利呈现出先上升后下降的趋势,并采用案例分析的方式对理论结论加以验证。相关结论可为反垄断执法机构对平台企业独家交易行为开展执法提供理论参考。Exclusive dealings,as commonly used competitive strategies for platforms,have become a focus of attention for competition authorities.However,subject to factors such as cross-network externalities in bilateral markets and highly competitive dynamics,how to identify the competitive effects of exclusive dealings has become a keystone in supervision.Based on the facts of the catering takeaway platforms in China,the social surplus reveals a trend from rise to decline when platforms provide exclusive contracts to their suppliers,which can provide references to the competition authorities.

关 键 词：平台经济 独家交易 二选一 竞争 反垄断 

分 类 号：F724.6[经济管理—产业经济] D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]