垂直薪酬差异对真实盈余管理的影响研究  

The Effect of Vertical Pay Dispersion on Real Earnings Management

作　　者：邓鸣茂[1] 梅春 陆蓉[3] Deng Mingmao;Mei Chun;Lu Rong(School of Finance,Shanghai University of International Business and Economics,Shanghai 201620,P.R.China;School of Credit Management,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,P.R.China;School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620 [2]广东金融学院信用管理学院,广州510521 [3]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433

出　　处：《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2021年第2期161-173,共13页Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“交易传染与非理性价格形成:基于投资者画像的精准识别”(71773072);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金一般项目“非金融企业的金融化研究:影子银行与系统性金融风险”(20YJA790080);广东省普通高校特色创新类项目“高管外部薪酬差距对企业创新影响研究——以广东省为例”(2019WTSCX073)。

摘　　要：薪酬激励是影响高管盈余管理行为的重要因素,既有文献多关注股权激励等显性薪酬激励,而鲜有文献研究垂直薪酬差异等隐性薪酬激励对高管管理行为的影响。以中国上市公司数据作为研究样本,实证研究了CEO与非CEO高管间的垂直薪酬差异对非CEO高管真实盈余管理行为及公司真实盈余管理水平的影响。研究发现,垂直薪酬差异能够激励非CEO高管减少真实盈余管理行为,降低了公司真实盈余管理水平。当非CEO高管预期晋升概率较高和公司治理机制较完善时,垂直薪酬差异对非CEO高管减少真实盈余管理行为的激励效应更强。这为垂直薪酬差异对公司真实盈余管理的影响提供了经验证据,也对中国上市公司建立合理的薪酬制度和提升财务报告质量有重要参考意义。Compensation incentive is an important factor influencing the behavior of executives earnings management.There is literature that focuses on explicit compensation incentives such as equity incentives,while there is little literature that studies how vertical pay dispersion on executives implicit compensation incentives such as tournament incentives affects executives earnings management behavior.Using data from Chinese listed companies as the research sample,this paper empirically investigates the impact of vertical pay dispersion between CEO and non-CEO executives on non-CEO executives real earnings management behavior and the firm s real earnings management level.This study finds that vertical pay dispersion can motivate non-CEO executives to reduce real earnings management behavior and reduce the level of firm s real earnings management.This study also finds that vertical pay dispersion has a stronger incentives effect on non-CEO executives to reduce earnings management behavior when they have higher expected promotion probabilities and better corporate governance mechanisms.This paper provides empirical evidence of the impact of vertical pay dispersion on firm s real earnings management,and also has important implications for Chinese listed companies in establishing a reasonable compensation system and improving the quality of financial reporting.

关 键 词：垂直薪酬差异 锦标赛激励 真实盈余管理 公司治理机制 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275F272.92