破产重整中债转股法律问题研究  

Research on legal issues of debt to equity swap in bankruptcy reorganization

作　　者：郭溢 GUO Yi(Central South University,Faculty of Law,Changsha 410000,China)

机构地区：[1]中南大学法学院,湖南长沙410000

出　　处：《周口师范学院学报》2021年第1期114-118,共5页Journal of Zhoukou Normal University

摘　　要：债转股制度具有融资、清偿两方面的工具价值,是企业破产重整时期破产企业、债权人、金融资产管理公司三方利益博弈的产物。法律制度的不健全和模糊致使实务中市场化债转股在从债转股方案的通过到债权人退出过程中无不存在法律问题,导致其在降低企业杠杆率与资产负债率,挽救企业危机的目的大打折扣。20年债转股制度的探索在转股企业范围、转股债权条件、实施机构等方面相对完善,但依然存在债权转股权法理争议、表决规则不明确、实施机构职责不明、落地难等问题,通过明确表决表决规则与实施机构职责,引入优先股制度和多渠道扩宽股权退出渠道等措施,促使债转股制度沿着市场化、法制化方向发展。The debt to equity swap system has the instrumental value of financing and paying off.It is the product of the tripartite interest game among bankrupt enterprises,creditors and financial asset management companies during the period of enterprise bankruptcy and reorganization.The imperfection and fuzziness of the legal system leads to legal problems in the process from the adoption of the debt to equity swap scheme and the withdraw of creditors.The imperfection and lag of the legal system of national debt to equity swap lead to the reduction of enterprise leverage ratio and asset liability ratio,and the purpose of saving enterprise crisis.The 20 years exploration of debt to equity swap system is relatively perfect in terms of the scope of equity conversion enterprises,creditor’s rights conditions and implementation institutions.However,there are still some problems,such as legal disputes,unclear voting rules,unclear responsibilities of implementing agencies and difficulties in landing.Through clarifying the voting rules and responsibilities of implementing agencies,introducing preferred stock system and expanding equity exit channels through multiple channels measures to promote the debt to equity system along the market-oriented legal development.

关 键 词：债转股 市场化 杠杆率 股权退出 

分 类 号：D922.291.92[政治法律—经济法学]