从康德的间接义务论看动物权利问题  

A Comment on Animal Rights from Kant’s Indirect Duty Theory

作　　者：双修海 尹维坤[2] SHUANG Xiu-hai;YIN Wei-kun(School of Marxism,Dongguan University of Technology,Dongguan,Guangdong 523808;Institute for Science Technology and Society,South China Normal University,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]东莞理工学院马克思主义学院,广东东莞523808 [2]华南师范大学科学技术与社会研究院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2020年第11期99-104,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“语境主义反怀疑论方案批判研究”(18BZX040)。

摘　　要：动物权利问题在环境哲学中引起广泛争议。康德基于人类中心主义提出间接义务论的解决方案,但遭到主张直接义务论的自然中心主义的严厉拒斥,后者指责康德的人类中心主义是导致环境污染和生态破坏的罪魁祸首。本文试图为康德的间接义务论提供辩护:一方面论证以自然中心主义为基础的直接义务论犯了"上帝之眼"的错误,在理论和实践上不能一以贯之;另一方面论证康德以人类中心主义为基础的间接义务论不仅可以避免直接义务论的困难,而且可以容纳自然中心主义关于保护环境和野生动物的合理诉求。The issue of animal rights is widely controversial in environmental philosophy. Kant put forward the solution of indirect duty theory based on anthropocentrism, but was severely rejected by the natural-centralism,which advocated direct duty theory, the latter accused Kant’s anthropocentrism as the culprit of environmental pollution and ecological destruction. This paper tries to provide a defense for Kant: On the one hand, direct obligation theory,which is based on natural-centralism has made a mistake of "God’s eye", so it is difficult to consistent in theory and practice;On the other hand, Kant’s indirect obligation theory,which is based on anthropocentrism not only can avoid the difficulty of direct obligation theory, but also can accommodate the natural-centralism’s rational demands about protecting environmentalism and wild animal.

关 键 词：动物权利 康德 人类中心主义 自然中心主义 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]