Home purchase restriction, real estate investment, and corporate innovation  

作　　者：Weida Kuang Changyu Chen Qilin Wang 

机构地区：[1]Department of Finance,Business School,Renmin University of China,59 Zhongguancun Street,Haidian District,Beijing 100872,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Business Research in China》2020年第4期519-539,共21页中国高等学校学术文摘·工商管理研究（英文版）

基　　金：This research is funded by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71373276).

摘　　要：It is ubiquitous for non-real estate firms to condua real estate business in China.Home purchase restriction(HPR)affeas corporate innovation by dampening the real estate investment of non-real estate firms.The extant literature has examined the impaa of HPR on corporate innovation,but it has not focused on the expeaation of HPR and the endogeneity problem.Employing a dataset of 1,830 listed non-real estate firms over the period 2009-2016,this research explores the expectation of HPR on corporate innovation based on the motivations for real estate investment in non-real estate firms.We demonstrate that HPR facilitates the enhancement of research and development(R&D)investment in non-real estate listed firms by hindering real estate investment,particularly for non-high-tech firms.The effects of HPR arrive at the crest in the third implementation year and remain steady thereafter.The real estate investment of non-real estate firms rebounds and the R&D investment declines along with the cancellation of HPR.Tackling the selection bias and endogeneity problems,the baseline results are also robust.Hence,HPR should serve as a long-term vehicle to improving corporate innovation,in addition to preventing housing speculation.

关 键 词：Home purchase restriaion(HPR)expeaation Real estate investment Nonreal estate firms Corporate innovation 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]