差错责任追究制度与分析师盈余预测  

Accountability for Major Errors System and Analysts’Earnings Forecast

作　　者：刘婷[1] 刘文军[1] 谢帮生[1] LIU Ting;LIU Wenjun;XIE Bangsheng(Fujian Agricultural and Forestry University,FuZhou,350002)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学管理学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2021年第1期95-109,共15页China Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71702032);福建省科技厅软科学项目(项目批准号:2018R0015);2018年度福建省高等学校新世纪优秀人才支持计划(项目批准号:K8018L47A);福建农林大学科技创新专项基金项目(项目批准号:CXZX2019004);福建省社科研究基地重大项目(FJ2018JDZ064)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文分别从分析师跟踪、盈余预测误差和分歧度三个方面考察年报信息披露重大差错责任追究制度对分析师行为的影响。研究发现,建立差错责任追究制度公司的分析师跟踪人数更多、盈余预测误差和分歧度更低,并且这种关系主要存在于高管为男性以及盈余质量较差的公司。进一步研究发现,建立差错责任追究制度的公司盈余信息含量更高、分析师更可能发布现金流预测。研究结论表明,差错责任追究制度改善了公司信息披露环境。本文不但丰富了分析师盈余预测影响因素领域的研究,同时对上市公司强化内部治理以及相关部门的监管均具有重要启示。This paper examines the impact on the accountability system’s behavior for major errors in information disclosure in annual reports.The paper employs three aspects to measure analysts’behavior:the number of analysts following the firm,analyst’s earnings forecast error,and forecast divergence.The results show that firms with the accountability for errors system have more analysts following them,whose earnings forecast errors and forecast divergence are also lower.This pattern mainly exists in firms with male executives and low quality of earnings.The paper also finds that the accountability for errors system makes the firm’s earnings more informative;thus,analysts are more likely to forecast accurate cash flow.This paper demonstrates that the accountability for errors system improves the information environment.It contributes to the literature by enriching the related research on the analysts’forecast of earnings and providing empirical implications for firms to strengthen internal governance and improve relevant departments’supervision.

关 键 词：差错责任追究制度 分析师跟踪 盈余预测准确性 盈余预测分歧度 盈余质量 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275