佛教逻辑学的论辩解释与认知解释——陈那、法称与因明  

The Dialectic and Epistemic Interpretation of Buddhist Logic:Dignāga,Dharmakīrti and the Hetuvidyā-Tradition

作　　者：汤铭钧 Mingjun Tang(Department of Religious Studies,School of Philosophy,Fudan University)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院宗教学系

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2021年第1期82-100,共19页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目(16AZD041)。

摘　　要：佛教逻辑有别于西方形式逻辑的一项重要特征,在于对论证前提为真的强调,并在此基础上提出了著名的"因三相"理论。论证前提的真,在陈那著作中又被理解为辩论主体将该前提确定为真。这种"确定"体现为文献中对"极成"(prasiddha)、"成"(siddha)、"决定"(ni?cita)、"见"(d???a)、"已知"(vidita)的强调。这些表达辩论者认知状态的词汇,皆可概括为佛教逻辑中的"认知算子"(epistemic operator)。本文通过研究东亚因明与法称两个传统对陈那《正理门论》中"决定同许"的理论设定的不同解释,说明因明传统在陈那奠定的方向上,进一步采取了"论辩解释"(dialectic interpretation),将"确定为真"解释为在辩论的情境中为辩论的双方承认为真(共许、同许)。法称《释量论自注》对陈那"决定同许"的解释,则表明由他开启的传统在陈那的基础上,进一步采取了"认知解释"(epistemic interpretation),将"确定为真"解释为在认识论的意义上得到确定(ni?cita/ni?caya,决定),即为有效认知的手段(量)所证成。这是因明传统与法称传统的一项根本差异。因明传统对辩论术的关注,极有可能反映了法称以前印度学界对陈那思想的诠释路径。A basic feature of Buddhist logic which distinguishes it from Western formal logic is that the Buddhist conception of what makes an argument good is grounded on the intuition that a good argument should start from true premises.In Buddhist logic,the truth of a premise is usually understood as being ascertained to be true by both the proponent and the opponent in a debate.Hence,the common ascertainment by both sides in debate,which is a special kind of epistemic condition,plays an essential role in defining the truth of a premise and in elucidating the standard of a good argument.Vocabularies used by Buddhist logicians to refer to this kind of epistemic condition,like siddha"established,"prasiddha"well established."niscita"ascertained,"drsta"observed"and vidita"known,"are considered by the present author as the epistemic operator in Buddhist logic.This paper is a preliminary study of the interpretation of this kind of epistemic operator by Buddhist logicians.In Nyāyamukha 2.2,Dignaga(c.480-540 CE)claimed that not only the logical reason’s(hetu)being a property of the subject(paksa)but also the relation of the logical reason to the similar instances(sapaksa)and to the dissimilar instances(vipaksa)should be"ascertained by[both]the proponent and the opponent"(vadiprativadiniscita).By comparing the interpretation of this claim in the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic,i.e.,the hetuvidya-tradition,with the interpreation of it by Dharmakirti(c.600-660 CE),this paper finds that the hetuvidya-tradition held a dialectic interpretation of the epistemic operator in Buddhist logic.The"dialectic"interpretation means that an expression’s being"ascertained"/"[well]established"/"known"is simply to be equally accepted by both sides in debate on account of whatever evidence.In contrast,Dharmakirti,in his Pramanavrrttikasvavrtti 13,5-19,clearly refused this dialectic interpretation and proposed instead an epistemic interpretation of the epistemic operator.In this connection,he quoted and reinterpreted Dignāga’s above cla

关 键 词：认知算子 陈那 法称 因明 佛教逻辑 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]