高校教师评价体系管理成本最小化陷阱研究  

The Trap of Management Cost Minimization on University Faculty Evaluation System

作　　者：杨君 李春娜 Yang Jun;Li Chunna

机构地区：[1]暨南大学公共管理学院/应急管理学院

出　　处：《高等工程教育研究》2021年第2期115-121,共7页Research in Higher Education of Engineering

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“政策过程中的‘民意赤字’与‘任务超载’风险形成机理及对策研究”(20BGL230)。

摘　　要：将管理者机会主义行动引入高校教师评价体系的交易成本、管理成本及社会代价的多维度分析发现的管理成本最小化陷阱及其形成机制,突破了高校教师评价体系技术发展说、制度演进说、公共合约说及交易成本说对管理者理想类型预设,突出了信息不对称和管理者主导条件下管理者机会主义行动自然导致的管理成本最小化制度安排及其困局强化,进而产生制度演进隐形障碍。该发现不仅可深化人们对中国高校教师评价体系的独特性认识,也有助于从新视角发现改革阻力及化解之道。The managerial opportunism behavior is introduced in the research on university faculty evaluation system in this paper.And the trap on management cost minimization and its formation mechanism are found in the muti-dimensional analysis on its transaction cost,management cost and social cost.It not only breaks through the ideal type of managers presupposed by hypotheses on university faculty evaluation system,but also highlights the institutional arrangement on management cost minimization and its dilemma leading into the invisible obstacle on system evolution,which is caused by managerial opportunism behavior under the condition on information asymmetry and managers’leading.These findings deepen the unique understanding of university faculty evaluation system in China and benefit to explore reform resistance and its solutions from a new perspective.

关 键 词：高校教师 评价体系 交易成本 管理成本 社会代价 

分 类 号：G645.1[文化科学—高等教育学]