基于收益共享和一致定价的双渠道定价与库存联合优化  被引量:7

Joint Optimization of Dual Channel Pricing and Inventory Based on Revenue Sharing and Uniform Pricing

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作  者:李富昌[1] 吴璐 胡晓辉[1] LI Fu-chang;WU Lu;HU Xiao-hui(School of Economics and Management,Yunnan Normal University,Kunming 650500,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区:[1]云南师范大学经济与管理学院,云南昆明650500 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出  处:《系统科学学报》2021年第1期57-62,共6页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71962037,71562036);云南省哲学社会科学教育科学规划项目(AD18012);教育部产学合作协同育人项目(201802098054);云南省教育厅科学研究基金项目(2018JS140);云南省哲学社会科学规划项目(QN2019026)。

摘  要:如今双渠道模式成为了日益重要的销售方式,即零售渠道和直销模式并存。研究双渠道供应链在相同定价条件下的协调优化,分别建立了分散决策和集中决策模型,在此基础上构建双渠道收益共享契约模型,此契约可以通过收益分成策略消除分散决策下双重边际效应导致的供应链绩效损失,同时提高供应链和零售商利润。在供应链协调的条件下,进一步比较分析得到共享条件下的批发价格低于分散决策,而契约下其供应链总收益远远大于分散模式,最后利用数值算例对以上结论进行了验证。Nowadays,the dual-channel model has become an increasingly important sales mode,that is,retail channels and direct sales mode coexist.In this paper,the coordination and optimization of dualchannel supply chain under the same pricing conditions are studied,and the decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making models are established respectively.On this basis,the dual-channel revenue sharing contract model is constructed.The contract can eliminate the supply chain performance loss caused by the dual marginal effect under decentralized decision-making,and at the same time improve the profits of supply chain and retailers.Under the condition of supply chain coordination,the wholesale price under the condition of sharing is lower than the decentralized decision,and the total income of the supply chain under the contract is much larger than the decentralized model.Finally,the above conclusions are verified by numerical examples.

关 键 词:一致定价 收益共享 双渠道 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号:N949[自然科学总论—系统科学]

 

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