供需匹配中的非诚信行为预防  

Prevention of Dishonest Behavior in Supply-Demand Matching

作　　者：张少杰 鹿旭东 郭伟 王世鹏 何伟 ZHANG Shao-jie;LU Xu-dong;GUO Wei;WANG Shi-peng;HE Wei(School of Software,Shandong University,Jinan 250000,China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学软件学院,济南250000

出　　处：《计算机科学》2021年第4期303-308,共6页Computer Science

基　　金：国家重点研发计划(2019YFB1705904);山东省重大科技创新工程项目(2019JZZY020505,2019JZZY010109,2018YFJH0506)。

摘　　要：供需匹配问题可以通过社交网络(Social Network,SN)下的众包模式得到解决。但由于实际应用中的非合作约束,以及社交网络的隐私保护机制,众包的参与者具有通过非诚信行为获利的动机与条件。这类行为会影响公平性原则,并将导致网络中信任链的崩塌,最终使得整个众包模式的供需匹配规则失效。为解决众包供需匹配方法中的非诚信问题,考虑通过分布式公开记账的方式来确保成员如实汇报个体的行为与状态,并通过核对公开的信息来寻找两类非诚信者。此外,设计基于信誉的惩罚机制来对抗非诚信行为,并最终通过理论分析证明了此机制的有效性与可行性。在此机制下,众包参与者的最优策略便是保证诚实。Supply-demand matching problem can be solved by crowdsourcing in social networks(SN).However,due to the non-cooperative constraints in practical applications and the privacy protection mechanism of social networks,participants of crowdsourcing have the motivation and conditions to profit from dishonest behaviors.This kind of behavior affects the fairness principle,and will lead to the collapse of the trust chain in the networ.In order to solve the problem of dishonest behavior in the crowdsourcing supply-demand matching method,this paper considers the distributed public accounting to ensure that members truthfully report individual behavior and status,and looks for two types of dishonest individuals by checking the public information.This paper also designs a punishment mechanism based on reputation to counter dishonest behavior.Finally,the validity and feasibility of our mechanism are proved by theoretical analysis.Under the mechanism,the best strategy for crowdsourcing participants is to be honest.

关 键 词：供需匹配 众包 非诚信行为 非合作 社交网络 

分 类 号：TP399[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]