“限房价”、“限地价”和“竞配建”的调控机理及政策效果  

The Regulation Mechanisms and Effects of“Setting Ceiling Prices for Houses and Land”and“Bidding for Free Construction Areas”on Land Prices

作　　者：王雪峰[1] WANG Xuefeng(School of Tourism&Urban Management,Jiangxi University of Finance&Economics,Nanchang 330032,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学旅游与城市管理学院,江西南昌330032

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2021年第2期41-49,83,共10页China Land Science

摘　　要：研究目的:探讨新土地出让规则的调控机理,比较其调控效果、城际差异及背后原因。研究方法:比较静态分析和计量经济分析。研究结果:理论上"X+竞配建"类和最高限价类出让规则均能有效降低地价,但条件和成本不同;在样本城市中,前者降地价效果在统计上均显著,因"竞配建"能更有效地加大拿地成本、减少土地需求;后者效果不佳,其中"限房价、竞地价"均无效,因市场均衡价格的高度不可见性导致难以设定合理的最高限价。研究结论:"竞配建"规则调控效果佳、弹性高、成本低和正外部性强,宜作为常备调控工具推广使用;最高限价类规则实施的技术难度较高、刚性大且成本高,宜在极端市场条件下使用,且时间不易长。The purposes of this paper are to investigate the regulation mechanisms of new land leasing rules,to compare their effects on land prices in sampling cities and to explore the underlying causalities.The methods of comparative static analysis and econometric analysis based on Auction-Hedonic Price Model are used.The results indicate that1)theoretically,all new rules are effective on decreasing land prices with different preconditions and costs,2)the empirical analyses show the rules of"X+Bidding for free construction areas"are better than those of setting ceiling price,and 3)the former rules can more effectively increase the cost of bidders to reduce land demand and prices,but the latter is hard to set a suitable ceiling price due to invisible market equilibrium prices.In conclusion,with better regulation effect,higher elasticity,lower costs and positive externality,the rule of"bidding for free construction areas"should be applied as a standing regulation tool.On the contrary,the rule of"setting ceiling price"should be temporarily used in some extreme cases like price bubbles.

关 键 词：土地经济 机理 政策效果 拍卖—特征价格模型 最高限价 竞配建 

分 类 号：F301.3[经济管理—产业经济]