制造商和分销商的再制造进入决策研究  

Research on Decision of Remanufacturing Entry for Manufacturers and Distributors

作　　者：杨明歌[1] 韦阳 梁小珍[1] YANG Mingge;WEI Yang;LIANG Xiaozhen(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2021年第1期82-91,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(11801352,71701122)。

摘　　要：低碳经济背景下,再制造是促进经济可持续发展的重要手段,而是否进入再制造是闭环供应链中制造商和分销商的重要决策。首先,建立制造商和分销商的双方演化博弈模型,利用Jacobi矩阵分析制造商和分销商混合策略的演化稳定性。结果表明:当制造商单位回收品的利润大于制造商销售单位新产品的利润,且分销商单位回收品的利润扣除再制造授权费用后大于分销商销售单位新产品的利润时,系统演化至制造商和分销商均进入再制造的状态。其次,考虑政府补贴对制造商和分销商决策的影响,建立政府补贴情形下制造商和分销商的双方演化博弈模型,利用Jacobi矩阵分析制造商和分销商混合策略的演化稳定性。结果表明:当制造商单位回收品的利润与政府补贴之和大于制造商销售单位新产品的利润,且分销商单位回收品的利润与政府补贴之和扣除再制造授权费用后大于分销商销售单位新产品的利润时,系统演化至制造商和分销商均进入再制造的状态。最后,通过数值仿真验证相关结论的正确性。Under the background of low carbon economy,remanufacturing is an important means to promote sustainable development of economy. It was very crucial whether manufacturers and distributors enter remanufacturing in the closed-loop supply chain.One evolutionary game model was built for manufacturers and distributors,and Jacobi matrix was used to analyze the evolutionary stability of mixed strategies for manufacturers and distributors. The results show that both manufacturers and distributors enter remanufacturing when the following two conditions are satisfied.The profit per recycled product is greater than the profit per new product for manufacturers.The profit per recycled product after deducting the fee of remanufacturing authorization is greater than the profit per new product for distributors. Furtherly,the similar problem was discussed under the case of government subsidy. Both manufacturers and distributors are willing to enter remanufacturing under the situation of government subsidy when the following two conditions are satisfied.The sum of the profit per recycled product and the government subsidy per recycled product is greater than the profit per new product for manufacturers. The sum of the profit per recycled product and the government subsidy per recycled product after deducting the fee of remanufacturing authorization is greater than the profit per new product for distributors.In addition,some numerical simulations were given to verify the correctness of our results.

关 键 词：再制造 演化博弈 复制动态方程 授权费用 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]