集中与分权的历史逻辑——“共同纲领”时期我国宪制的建构、运行与更张  

The Historical Logic of Centralization and Decentralization--The Construction,Operation and Transition of Chinese Constitutional System during the"Common Program"Period

作　　者：李一达 Li Yida

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学法学院

出　　处：《政法论坛》2021年第2期58-72,共15页Tribune of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“中国宪法学文献整理与研究”(项目编号:17ZDA125);博士后科学基金第63批面上资助(项目编号:2018M630240)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：1949年《共同纲领》与《政府组织法》共同确立了堪称"四九宪制"的国家权力配置基本格局。与以苏联为代表的社会主义宪法传统不同,四九宪制虽然同奉议行合一原理为圭臬,却有自己的独特创造,表现为通过中央人民政府主席这一职位实现议、行两端的权力集中。然而决策权与执行权在规范层面的分工模糊与权能交叠,使四九宪制在实际运行中无法确保中央人民政府主席对国家事务直接和经常的领导。随着机构改革与权力重组的受挫,这一时期宪制的制度弹性逐渐耗尽,新政权的缔造者们最终通过在1954年《宪法》中对最高国务会议制度的设计实现了对议行合一体制的重设。The 1949"Common Program"and the Organic Law of the Government together established the basic pattern of disposition of state power,known as the"Forty-nine Constitution System".Unlike the socialist constitutional tradition represented by the Soviet Union,the"Forty-nine Constitution System",although sharing the same principle of the combination of legislative and executive powers,has its own unique creation in that the centralization of power at both the legislative brunch and the executive brunch is achieved through the position of the Chairman of the Central People’s Government.However,the blurred division of labor and overlapping powers between the decision-making and executive powers at the normative level prevents the constitutional system from ensuring the direct and constant leadership of the Central People’s Government chairman over state affairs in actual operation.The institutional flexibility of the constitutional system during this period was gradually exhausted as institutional reforms and power reorganization were impeded,and the founders of the new regime eventually reestablished the combination of legislative and executive powers through the design of the Supreme State Council system in the 1954 Constitution.

关 键 词：四九宪制 议行合一 中央人民政府主席 最高国务会议 

分 类 号：D921[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]